編輯｜克萊恩

出品｜馬路咖啡 in

路特斯跑車又因為高層言論上熱搜了。

6 月 3 日，CEO 馮擎峰接受訪問時拋出「1.8 公噸分水嶺」論，稱「只要重量超過 1.8 公噸，就係廢車」。呢番表態迅速登頂微博熱搜，成為汽車圈罕見嘅熱搜第一。伴隨其發酵嘅，係路特斯正式放棄 Vision80 全面純電戰略，切換至「Focus 2030」燃油、混動、純電三線並行路線。

從 2017 年 6 月被吉利收購至今，路特斯已走過整整九年。但讓人記住嘅產品亮點唔多，高層「暴論」同營銷翻車卻頻頻出圈。呢個中外「混血」混咗九年，似乎只係「混」咗個寂寞？

「廢車」論嘅撕裂

新能源車越來越重，真係行業熱門話題。如果馮擎峰只係呼籲純電跑車應重視減重，本本身係冇乜問題。但佢嘅表達過於激進，「打擊面」過大。

更尷尬係，路特斯自己嘅純電轎車 Emeya 整備質量 2455-2590kg，限量超跑 Evija 亦達 1887kg，均超過 1.8 公噸。兄弟品牌極氪嘅性能車型同樣「超標」。

考慮到語境，馮擎峰大概想表達純電跑車好難做出傳統燃油跑車嘅駕駛感，性能同車重嘅矛盾喺電動車上更尖銳，因此路特斯放棄純電跑車路線。

企業戰略判斷本身無可厚非，但發表呢種帶著「自我撕裂感」嘅暴論，必然引發非議。從熱搜登頂、網友群嘲嘅結果看，呢波「輿論鋪墊」顯然搞砸咗。

回顧路特斯九年，令人唏噓。

呢個以極致輕量化、空氣動力學、純粹操控著稱嘅品牌，沒讓新產品重現榮光，反而靠高層「暴論」同營銷翻車頻頻出圈。

馮擎峰嘅犀利言論唔止呢一次。

2025 年 2 月，佢發微博稱「彎道快嘅只有路特斯同保時捷」，彼時正值雷軍宣佈小米 SU7 Ultra 為「地表最快四門量產車」，被網友解讀為暗諷小米，引發米粉反擊。

更荒誕嘅係，部分網友誤將「蓮花控股」（賣味精嘅）當成路特斯跑車，跑去蓮花味精抖音帳號攻擊，逼得對方發影片澄清：「清湯大老爺們，俺唔賣跑車。」

2024 年 7 月，馮擎峰承諾路特斯「定位百萬元級豪華品牌，絕不參與價格戰」。僅半年後，新款 Eletre 同 Emeya 大幅減價，老車主集體維權。同時，Eletre 中文名「夏花」因諧音「下滑」遭抵制，路特斯被迫道歉並停用。

2023 年嘅翻車更加密集：武漢路特斯試駕車當新車賣、Eletre 三次減配未告知車主、蘇州路特斯中心舉辦驗資 5000 萬相親活動。

如此多嘅「出圈」事件，好難不讓人覺得呢家企業已形成咗靠暴論博眼球嘅路徑依賴。對新品牌而言，呢或係內捲下嘅冒險；但對豪華品牌而言，呢種方式極其傷品牌。

被迫戰略轉向

與呢啲出圈事件相伴嘅，係唔溫唔火嘅業績。

路特斯 1996 年被馬來西亞寶騰集團收購，2017 年 6 月轉投吉利。吉利入主前，路特斯年銷僅 1600 餘輛。2018 年，路特斯發布 Vision80 戰略，承諾 2027 年全面純電化，此後推出 Evija、Eletre、Emeya 三款純電車型。

2024 年，路特斯年銷量達 12,134 輛，同比增長 74%，創歷史最佳。但呢一勢頭未能維持，2025 年全年銷量僅 6,520 輛，同比減少 46%。2021 年至 2025 年，累計虧損超過 31 億美元。

銷量低迷倒逼企業戰略轉向，2024 年官方已經實際上放棄咗全面電動化戰略。

按照新嘅 Focus 2030 戰略要求，短期內企業要實現約 60% 插電混動與 40% 純電嘅產量組合。馮擎峰預測 2026 年銷量將達 1 萬餘台，並聲稱得益於吉利體系支持，通過平台共享、聯合採購、協同研發，年銷 3 萬輛即可收支平衡。

「混」咗個寂寞？

復盤路特斯嘅轉型，失敗本質上係「時代誤判」疊加「結構性脆弱」嘅結果。

路特斯跑車彼時確定全面純電動化戰略並不算「激進」，因為這幾乎係當時汽車行業嘅「政治正確」，跨國巨頭們接連拋出一個比一個激進嘅電動化轉型目標，路特斯最多算係「追隨者」。

近兩年，跨國巨頭紛紛撤回/調整電動化轉型目標說明，呢係個「時代誤判」，而非路特斯跑車一家企業嘅錯誤。

可問題在於，大家都錯咗不等於大家嘅代價都一樣，當全行業集體回調戰略時，不同品牌嘅抗風險能力同糾錯空間天差地別，BBA 們也為轉型失敗支付咗高昂代價，但仍有一個燃油車基本盤支撐，仍係有調整機會。

作為小體量品牌嘅路特斯跑車則冇咗大咗咁嘅回旋餘地，如果唔係大股東吉利近些年的電動化轉型取得咗成功，路特斯跑車恐怕連呢次戰略轉向嘅機會都冇。

更具體睇來，純電化同路特斯品牌基因的「輕量化」存在不可調和嘅矛盾，呢個矛盾喺其他以性能著稱嘅品牌上也存在，但冇任何一個品牌會比路特斯跑車更被動，可偏偏佢喺最一開始就以「孤注一擲」嘅姿態選擇咗全面純電化，甚至沒給自己留咗一點過渡空間。

平心而論，Eletre 同 Emeya 嘅底盤調校與空氣動力學設計喺同級中並不遜色，但路特斯冇把呢啲技術優勢轉化為品牌故事，反而用「廢車論」呢種粗暴方式自我否定，呢先係最大嘅浪費。

另外一層，路特斯跑車呢個中外「混血」有其天然缺陷。

而家睇，一個享譽全球嘅跑車品牌 + 中國領先新能源車技術/供應鏈，簡直係「天選」搭配；但在彼時，呢種模式並冇得到市場認可，市場看路特斯仲處於「換殼吉利」/「換殼極氪」嘅階段，對佢顯然毫無向上拉動力量，反而更多係拖累。

冇有領先故事可講嘅豪華跑車品牌，想煥發新生難如登天，所以亦唔怪路特斯跑車選擇以「暴論」博眼球。

不過，形勢正喺變化。全球汽車市場對「轉型必須依靠中國產業鏈」已達成深度共識，中國本土品牌嘅高端化亦成功實現咗對跨國巨頭嘅逆襲。極氪 9X、領克 900 等車型嘅全球瘋搶意味著，此時「換殼極氪」嘅標籤甚至係路特斯跑車嘅闖關利器咗。

九年之後，呢個「混血」嘅路特斯跑車，其血統或許比任何一家純血跨國巨頭都更「高貴」。此時從純電執念中抽身，轉向混動與燃油，反而可能係它最好嘅時間窗口。

只係，如果繼續靠「暴論」博眼球，而唔係用產品重建「輕量化」同「純粹操控」嘅品牌信仰，再好嘅窗口都會浪費。路特斯需要嘅唔係熱搜，而係一款讓人忘記熱搜嘅車。

Editor | Klein

Produced by | Road Coffee in

Lotus Cars is trending again due to executive remarks.

On June 3, CEO Feng Qingfeng threw out the "1.8-ton watershed" theory during an interview, stating "If the weight exceeds 1.8 tons, it's a junk car." This statement quickly topped the Weibo trending list, becoming the rare No. 1 trending topic in the automotive circle. As the controversy spread, Lotus officially abandoned the Vision80 full electrification strategy, switching to a "Focus 2030" route running fuel, hybrid, and pure electricity lines in parallel.

From being acquired by Geely in June 2017 to now, Lotus has gone through nine full years. But there aren't many product highlights people remember; executive "extreme statements" and marketing failures often go viral. This Sino-foreign "hybrid" has "mixed" for nine years, and it seems to have only "mixed" for nothing?

The Divide of the "Junk Car" Theory

New energy vehicles are getting heavier, which is indeed a hot topic in the industry. If Feng Qingfeng only advocated that pure electric sports cars should focus on weight reduction, there would be no problem. But his expression was too aggressive, and the "targeting scope" was too broad.

More awkwardly, Lotus's own pure electric sedan Emeya's curb weight is 2455-2590 kg, and the limited supercar Evija also reached 1887 kg, both exceeding 1.8 tons. Performance models of the brother brand Zeekr are also "over the limit".

Considering the context, Feng Qingfeng probably meant that pure electric sports cars are hard to replicate the driving feel of traditional fuel sports cars, and the contradiction between performance and vehicle weight is sharper on electric vehicles, so Lotus abandoned the pure electric sports car route.

The corporate strategic judgment itself is beyond reproach, but making such "self-torn" extreme statements will inevitably provoke controversy. Judging by the result of topping the trending list and netizen mockery, this wave of "public opinion setup" clearly failed.

Looking back at Lotus's nine years, it is regrettable.

This brand known for extreme lightweighting, aerodynamics, and pure handling, instead of letting new products regain glory, relied on executive "extreme statements" and marketing failures to go viral frequently.

Feng Qingfeng's sharp remarks are not just this time.

In February 2025, he posted on Weibo saying "Only Lotus and Porsche are fast on corners," at that time Lei Jun claimed Xiaomi SU7 Ultra is "The fastest four-door mass-produced car on the surface," which was interpreted by netizens as a subtle mockery of Xiaomi, triggering Mi fan counterattacks.

More absurdly, some netizens mistakenly took "Lotus Holdings" (seller of MSG) as Lotus Cars, ran to Lotus MSG Douyin account to attack, forcing them to issue a video clarification: "I'm an honest man, I don't sell sports cars."

In July 2024, Feng Qingfeng promised Lotus "Positioned as a million-level luxury brand, will never participate in price wars". Only half a year later, new Eletre and Emeya prices dropped significantly, old owners collectively protested. At the same time, Eletre Chinese name "Summer Blossom" was boycotted due to homophone with "Sliding Down", Lotus was forced to apologize and stop using it.

The 2023 failures were even denser: Wuhan Lotus test drive cars sold as new cars, Eletre reduced configuration three times without informing owners, Suzhou Lotus center held a 50 million capital verification matchmaking event.

With so many "viral" events, it is hard not to feel that this enterprise has formed a path dependence relying on extreme remarks to grab eyeballs.For new brands, this may be an adventure under involution; but for luxury brands, this method is extremely damaging to the brand.

Forced Strategic Shift

Accompanying these viral events is tepid performance.

Lotus was acquired by Malaysia Proton Group in 1996, switched to Geely in June 2017. Before Geely took over, Lotus annual sales were only over 1,600 units. In 2018, Lotus released the Vision80 strategy, promising full electrification by 2027, and subsequently launched three pure electric models: Evija, Eletre, and Emeya.

In 2024, Lotus annual sales reached 12,134 units, up 74% year-on-year, achieving the best in history. But this momentum could not be maintained, 2025 full year sales were only 6,520 units, down 46% year-on-year. From 2021 to 2025, cumulative losses exceeded 3.1 billion USD.

Low sales forced the enterprise to shift strategy, in 2024 the official team had actually abandoned the full electrification strategy.

According to the new Focus 2030 strategic requirements, in the short term the enterprise needs to achieve a production mix of about 60% plug-in hybrids and 40% pure electricity. Feng Qingfeng predicted 2026 sales will reach over 10,000 units, and claimed that benefiting from Geely system support, through platform sharing, joint procurement, collaborative R&D, annual sales of 30,000 units can break even.

"Mixed" for Nothing?

Reviewing Lotus's transformation, the failure is essentially the result of "era misjudgment" combined with "structural vulnerability".

Lotus Cars deciding on a full pure electricization strategy at that time was not "radical", because this was almost the "political correctness" of the automotive industry at the time, transnational giants successively threw out more and more radical electrification transformation goals, Lotus can at most be considered a "follower".

In the past two years, transnational giants successively withdrew/adjusted electrification transformation goals, indicating that this is an "era misjudgment", not the mistake of Lotus Cars alone.

But the problem is, everyone being wrong doesn't mean everyone pays the same price. When the whole industry collectively readjusts strategy, different brands' risk tolerance and room for error correction vary greatly. BBA also paid a high price for failed transformation, but still have the fuel vehicle base to support them and still have room for adjustment.

As a small-scale brand, Lotus Cars does not have such large room for maneuver. If not for major shareholder Geely's electrification transformation success in recent years, Lotus Cars probably would not have had the chance for this strategic shift at all.

Specifically,Pure electrification and Lotus brand gene's "lightweighting" exist an irreconcilable contradiction. This contradiction exists in other brands known for performance, but no brand is more passive than Lotus Cars, but coincidentally it chose full electrification with an "all-in" posture at the very beginning, even leaving no transition space for itself.

Fair to say, Eletre and Emeya's chassis tuning and aerodynamic design are not inferior in the same class, but Lotus did not convert these technical advantages into brand stories, instead using "Junk Car Theory" such a rough way to self-denial, this is the biggest waste.

Another layer is that Lotus Cars, this Sino-foreign "hybrid", has inherent defects.

Looking now, a sports car brand famous globally + China leading new energy vehicle technology/supply chain, simply a "heaven chosen" match; but at that time, this model was not accepted by the market, the market viewed Lotus still in the "Geely rebadged"/"Zeekr rebadged" stage, for it obviously had no upward pulling power at all, instead more of a drag.

A luxury sports car brand with no leading story to tell, wanting to be reborn is hard as climbing to heaven, so it is no wonder Lotus Cars chooses to grab eyeballs with "extreme statements".

However, the situation is changing. The global automotive market has reached a deep consensus that "transformation must rely on the Chinese supply chain", and Chinese local brands' high-end transformation has also successfully achieved a counterattack against transnational giants. The global frenzy in grabbing Zeekr 9X, Lynk & Co 900 and other models means that at this time, the label of "Zeekr rebadged" is even a weapon for Lotus Cars to pass the level.

Nine years later, this "hybrid" Lotus Cars, its bloodline might be more "noble" than any pure-blooded transnational giant. At this time, stepping away from pure electricity obsession, turning to hybrid and fuel, instead might be its best time window.

However, if continuing to rely on "extreme statements" to grab eyeballs, instead of using products to rebuild the brand faith of "lightweighting" and "pure handling", any good window will be wasted. Lotus does not need trending topics, but a car that makes people forget trending topics.

编辑｜克莱恩

出品｜马路咖啡in

莲花跑车又因为高管言论上热搜了。

6月3日，CEO冯擎峰接受采访时抛出"1.8吨分水岭"论，称"只要重量超过1.8吨，就是菜车"。这番表态迅速登顶微博热搜，成为汽车圈罕见的热搜第一。伴随其发酵的，是莲花正式放弃Vision80全面纯电战略，切换至"Focus 2030"燃油、混动、纯电三线并行路线。

从2017年6月被吉利收购至今，莲花已走过整整九年。但让人记住的产品亮点不多，高管"暴论"与营销翻车却频频出圈。这个中外"混血"混了九年，似乎只是"混"了个寂寞？

"菜车"论的撕裂

新能源车越来越重，确实是行业热门话题。如果冯擎峰只是呼吁纯电跑车应重视减重，本本身没有什么问题。但他的表达过于激进，"打击面"过大。

更尴尬的是，莲花自己的纯电轿车Emeya整备质量2455-2590kg，限量超跑Evija也达1887kg，均超过1.8吨。兄弟品牌极氪的性能车型同样"超标"。

考虑到语境，冯擎峰大概想表达纯电跑车很难做出传统燃油跑车的驾驶感，性能和车重的矛盾在电动车上更尖锐，因此莲花放弃纯电跑车路线。

企业战略判断本身无可厚非，但发表这种带着"自我撕裂感"的暴论，必然引发非议。从热搜登顶、网友群嘲的结果看，这波"舆论铺垫"显然搞砸了。

回顾莲花九年，令人唏嘘。

这个以极致轻量化、空气动力学、纯粹操控著称的品牌，没让新产品重现荣光，反而靠高管"暴论"和营销翻车频频出圈。

冯擎峰的犀利言论不止这一次。

2025年2月，他发微博称"弯道快的只有莲花和保时捷"，彼时正值雷军宣称小米SU7 Ultra为"地表最快四门量产车"，被网友解读为暗讽小米，引发米粉反击。

更荒诞的是，部分网友误将"莲花控股"（卖味精的）当成莲花跑车，跑去莲花味精抖音账号攻击，逼得对方发视频澄清："清汤大老爷们，俺不卖跑车。"

2024年7月，冯擎峰承诺莲花"定位百万级豪华品牌，绝不参与价格战"。仅半年后，新款Eletre和Emeya大幅降价，老车主集体维权。同时，Eletre中文名"夏花"因谐音"下滑"遭抵制，莲花被迫道歉并停用。

2023年的翻车更是密集：武汉路特斯试驾车当新车卖、Eletre三次减配未告知车主、苏州路特斯中心举办验资5000万相亲活动。

如此多的"出圈"事件，很难不让人觉得这家企业已形成了靠暴论博眼球的路径依赖。对新品牌而言，这或许是内卷下的冒险；但对豪华品牌而言，这种方式极其伤品牌。

被迫战略转向

与这些出圈事件相伴的，是不温不火的业绩。

莲花1996年被马来西亚宝腾集团收购，2017年6月转投吉利。吉利入主前，莲花年销仅1600余辆。2018年，莲花发布Vision80战略，承诺2027年全面纯电化，此后推出Evija、Eletre、Emeya三款纯电车型。

2024年，莲花年销量达12,134辆，同比增长74%，创历史最佳。但这一势头未能维持，2025年全年销量仅6,520辆，同比减少46%。2021年至2025年，累计亏损超过31亿美元。

销量低迷倒逼企业战略转向，2024年官方已经实际上放弃了全面电动化战略。

按照新的Focus 2030战略要求，短期内企业要实现约60%插混与40%纯电的产量组合。冯擎峰预测2026年销量将达1万余台，并声称得益于吉利体系支持，通过平台共享、联合采购、协同研发，年销3万辆即可盈亏平衡。

"混"了个寂寞？

复盘莲花的转型，失败本质上是"时代误判"叠加"结构性脆弱"的结果。

莲花跑车彼时确定全面纯电动化战略并不算“激进”，因为这几乎是当时汽车行业的“政治正确”，跨国巨头们接连抛出一个比一个激进的电动化转型目标，莲花最多算是“追随者”。

近两年，跨国巨头纷纷撤回/调整电动化转型目标说明，这是个“时代误判”，而非莲花跑车一家企业的错误。

可问题在于，大家都错了不等于大家的代价都一样，当全行业集体回调战略时，不同品牌的抗风险能力和纠错空间天差地别，BBA们也为转型失败支付了高昂代价，但仍有燃油车基本盘支撑，仍有调整机会。

作为小体量品牌的莲花跑车则没有这么大的回旋余地，如果不是大股东吉利近些年的电动化转型取得了成功，莲花跑车恐怕连这次战略转向的机会都没有。

更具体来看，纯电化和莲花品牌基因的“轻量化”存在不可调和的矛盾，这一矛盾在其他以性能著称的品牌上也存在，但没有任何一个品牌会比莲花跑车更被动，可偏偏它在最一开始就以“孤注一掷”的姿态选择了全面纯电化，甚至没给自己留一点过渡空间。

平心而论，Eletre和Emeya的底盘调校与空气动力学设计在同级中并不逊色，但莲花没有把这些技术优势转化为品牌故事，反而用"菜车论"这种粗暴方式自我否定，这才是最大的浪费。

另外一层，莲花跑车这个中外“混血”有其天然缺陷。

现在看，一个享誉全球的跑车品牌+中国领先新能源车技术/供应链，简直是“天选”搭配；但在彼时，这种模式并没有得到市场认可，市场看莲花还处在“换壳吉利”/“换壳极氪”的阶段，对其显然毫无向上拉动力量，反而更多是拖累。

没有领先故事可讲的豪华跑车品牌，想焕发新生难如登天，所以也不怪莲花跑车选择以“暴论”博眼球。

不过，形势正在变化。全球汽车市场对"转型必须依靠中国产业链"已达成深度共识，中国本土品牌的高端化也成功实现了对跨国巨头的逆袭。极氪9X、领克900等车型的全球疯抢意味着，此时“换壳极氪”的标签甚至是莲花跑车的闯关利器了。

九年之后，这个"混血"的莲花跑车，其血统或许比任何一家纯血跨国巨头都更"高贵"。此时从纯电执念中抽身，转向混动与燃油，反而可能是它最好的时间窗口。

只是，如果继续靠"暴论"博眼球，而不是用产品重建"轻量化"与"纯粹操控"的品牌信仰，再好的窗口也会浪费。莲花需要的不是热搜，而是一款让人忘记热搜的车。