Halfway through 2026, how are China's auto export report cards?
According to CAAM data, January to June total vehicle exports reached 4.059 million vehicles, up 63% year-on-year, with export value reaching $72.8 billion; May single-month exports reached 930,000 vehicles, up 68.7% year-on-year. According to authoritative forecasts, China's auto exports in 2026 may reach 10 million vehicles, up 41% year-on-year, becoming the first country to break 10 million vehicles in exports, about 2.5 times the second largest auto exporting country, Japan.

From this perspective, the data looks great, but behind these numbers, a current is actually surging.
Last year, Thailand was seen as a new blue ocean for exports, but the market share of Chinese brands plummeted from 47.3% in January to 11.6% in February; the EU is planning to expand anti-subsidy tariffs from pure EVs to PHEVs; Brazil has raised import tariffs on electric vehicles uniformly to 35%; after Russia significantly increased scrappage taxes, Chinese exports to Russia plummeted cliff-like.
Although the absolute number of Chinese car exports is still rising, it seems the doors of overseas markets are closing one by one. The wind direction has indeed changed, but the key issue is, is this just a breeze, or will it evolve into a destructive hurricane?
#Where are Chinese cars being sold in the first half of 2026?#
Although the European market has been 'blocking' the progress of Chinese cars, this is actually the biggest highlight of China's auto exports in the first half of 2026.
In the first quarter, China exported 438,400 vehicles to Europe, up 84.7% year-on-year; in April, Chinese brand market share in Europe rose to 9.8%; in May, BYD, SAIC, Geely, Chery, Leapmotor, five Chinese automakers, sold a total of 138,400 vehicles in Europe, up 65% year-on-year, surpassing Japanese brands (130,400 vehicles) for the first time.
Notably, relative to pure EV models, PHEVs are becoming a new growth curve, with exports of 106,000 vehicles in Q1, up 152.4% year-on-year. In January-April 2026, China's exports of PHEVs to the EU surpassed pure EVs for the first time, market share rose from about 30% in the same period of 2024 to over 55%.
Central and South American markets are another high-growth area.

BYD exported 101,132 vehicles to Central and South America in Q1, up 302.8% year-on-year. Starting July 1, 2026, Brazil will raise import tariffs on EVs uniformly to 35%, but before this, Chinese automakers had already completed massive export stocking.
The Southeast Asian market shows a complex duality.
January-February, Geely led Southeast Asian exports with 23,882 vehicles, up 136.9% year-on-year; BYD exported 13,279 vehicles, down 23.8% year-on-year; January-April, Geely increased to 46,418 vehicles, up 87.6% year-on-year; BYD 32,351 vehicles, down 25.0%. Overall, Southeast Asia is still growing, but the pace is slowing.
The Middle East market is undergoing structural switching, Chery still led with 56,248 vehicles in Q1, but down 39% year-on-year; BYD second with 33,171 vehicles, up 35.6%. In the past, this market was mainly fuel vehicles, but now fuel vehicles are switching to new energy.
The Russian market saw a cliff-like decline. After Russia raised import car scrappage taxes significantly, China's exports to Russia in the first nine months of 2025 fell nearly 60% year-on-year. In January 2026, although Chinese brands occupied 8 spots in the top 15 sales in Russia, sales for all brands declined year-on-year.
#Southeast Asia Market, Chinese Car 'False Fire'?#
The Southeast Asian market became the destination for concentrated overseas expansion of Chinese cars in the past period. Many automakers also took the markets in some parts of Southeast Asia as a springboard to later expand in ASEAN. In the past 2025, more than 20 Chinese car brands were active in the Southeast Asian market, many of which only formally entered this regional market after 2024.
In January this year, Chinese brands welcomed a historic moment in Thailand, with 47.34% market share, surpassing Japanese cars that had dominated the market for over 60 years for the first time. BYD ranked second in the market with 12,800 vehicles.
But just a month later, the situation turned for the worse. In February this year, Chinese brand market share plummeted to 11.6%. BYD dropped from 12,800 to 295 vehicles, a 97.7% quarter-on-quarter decline. No Chinese brand entered the top five in the Thai market, Japanese brand market share rebounded to 78.9%.

There is a policy reason behind this. Thailand's EV 3.0 plan expired, EV 3.5 plan took effect. EV purchase subsidies dropped sharply from a max of 150,000 Thai Baht to 50,000 Thai Baht. Import vehicle consumption tax adjusted back from 2% to 10%. In addition, superimposed 'production betting': in 2026, for every 1 vehicle imported, 2 must be produced in Thailand, and this rule will be raised to 1:3 in 2027.
So Chinese cars had to raise prices. Some models increased by more than 30%. When subsidies were withdrawn and prices went up, sales collapsed immediately.
Then does this reflect a problem? Is the development of Chinese cars in some overseas markets mainly relying on two points, one is price, the other is policy?
2025 can be said to be the breakout period for Chinese cars in Southeast Asia. But behind this trend, the market also experienced several price wars initiated by Chinese cars. Taking the Thai market as an example, in July of the second half of 2025, Chinese cars took the lead in launching an offensive in the price field. Some Chinese brands had price reductions as high as 340,000 Thai Baht (about $9,300), directly breaking the market price system at that time.
Last October, this offensive escalated again. BYD lowered prices of its models by up to 38%. SAIC MG's MG4 Electric D model followed suit, offering a 27% terminal concession. Among them, the MG4 Electric D model had already seen nearly 23% discount previously. After superimposing this round of discounts, the overall reduction far exceeded 20%.
Under this price offensive, Chinese brands represented by BYD occupied more than 70% of the Thai EV market share. Among them, BYD's single brand market share approached 50%. Sustained price competition also made Thailand the area with the fiercest price war in the Southeast Asian EV market.
But is the sales volume established this way strong enough?
This Thai policy switch is a good example. Besides, not only Thailand is gradually narrowing the policy for Chinese cars going overseas. Also Malaysia, starting July this year, implemented stricter restrictions on fully knocked-down electric vehicle imports. Minimum landed price raised to 200,000 Ringgit (about $51,000). Tax-inclusive retail price will not be lower than 300,000 Ringgit.
The reason given is simple: to protect local automotive brands, and to leave space for local cars to develop. Also, not to let the local market become a consumption ground for other countries' electrification capacity.
Know that previously the Malaysian market regarding the popularization of the electrification industry also opened up big welfare loopholes in policy. Such as exemption from import tax, domestic tax, and sales tax reductions, etc. Such policies naturally attracted many Chinese car brands. Like in the 2025 EV market sales list, brands like BYD, Zeekr were on the list.

But the one problem these countries have to consider is: How to develop the domestic industry chain? How to stabilize the local employment rate? So, what Southeast Asian countries are doing now is highly consistent: using policy to build walls, forcing Chinese automakers to shift from 'complete vehicle exports' to 'localization production'.
This wall will weaken the price advantage of Chinese cars in the short term. But in the long run it is not necessarily a bad thing. It forces Chinese automakers to go from 'selling products' to 'building capabilities'. But the question is, not every automaker has the ability to build factories overseas, manage supply chains, and adapt to local regulations.
Brands that only rely on complete vehicle export volume are being hit by the retreat of policy dividends. And this 'false fire' of going overseas, extinguished by the retreating tide, might not be a bad thing either.
#From Southeast Asia to Europe, The Wall Is Closing#
If Southeast Asia is 'building walls', Europe is 'raising the height of the walls'.
In October 2024, the EU officially imposed a five-year anti-subsidy tariff on Chinese-made pure electric vehicles. On top of the 10% base tariff, BYD was surcharged 17.0%, Geely 18.8%, SAIC Group 35.3%. Some models had a combined tax rate up to 45.3%.
But the response of Chinese automakers was much faster than expected. Since pure EVs were taxed, sell PHEVs. PHEV models previously only needed to pay the 10% base tariff. As mentioned earlier, in Q1 2026, China's exports of PHEVs to Europe grew 152.4% year-on-year, far exceeding the 94.6% of pure EVs.
But the EU soon found this bug. In June 2026, multiple media reported that the European Commission completed policy preparation for surcharging anti-subsidy tariffs on Chinese-made PHEVs, ready to implement upon member state approval.

Meanwhile, the EU is also building higher-dimensional institutional barriers. In March 2026, the EU published the 'Industrial Accelerator Act' proposal, proposing to implement 'conditional market access' on countries with global key industry manufacturing capacity share over 40%. Harsh conditions such as foreign equity holding not exceeding 49%, mandatory technology transfer, local employee ratio not less than 50% are being brewed.
Europe's logic is clear: not closing the door for you, but setting countless thresholds. If you can jump over it, come in; if not, leave on your own.
In January 2026, China and Europe reached a framework consensus on the 'Price Commitment' mechanism, using minimum import price to replace anti-subsidy tariffs. But as of June, price commitment negotiations are still progressing, not fully landed. This means Chinese automakers' exports to Europe are still in a 'policy vacuum period', neither the original low tariff, nor the new clear rules.
For top automakers already established in Europe, this is a capability screening. For SME brands still waiting and watching, this might be the beginning of being blocked outside the door.
#Outbound Concerns, Not Just Tariffs#
The map of Chinese auto exports is shifting from 'blossoming everywhere' to 'severe differentiation'. Except for the Southeast Asian and European markets mentioned earlier, currently Russia, China's largest single overseas market, is facing collapse.
Russia was once China's largest single destination for auto exports, with market share once exceeding 60%. But as Russia significantly increased import car scrappage tax, in the first nine months of 2025, China's exports to Russia fell nearly 60% year-on-year. In January 2026, although Chinese brands still occupied 8 spots in Russia, all declined year-on-year.
Export structure relying on a single market is extremely fragile. One policy change could likely cause the entire export line to collapse.
Meanwhile, a highlight of going overseas this year is the Central and South American market represented by Brazil. January-April 2026, China exported 286,000 passenger cars to Brazil, surging 226% year-on-year. Brazil surpassed Russia for the first time to become China's largest overseas auto market. January-May 2026, China's NEV exports to Brazil reached 289,600 vehicles, year-on-year increase as high as 184,000 vehicles. Brazil remains China's No. 1 export destination for NEVs.
Behind this, it was only on July 1, 2026 that import tariffs on complete vehicle new energy vehicles were formally raised from 25% to 35%. So before the tariff increase in the first half of this year, automakers were driven by 'export grabbing'. After the full tariff landed in July, the cost of direct complete vehicle imports rose significantly.
Almost visible, now many places are blocking this complete vehicle export model. So what Chinese automakers need to consider subsequently is from 'complete vehicle export' to 'capacity going overseas'. For some automakers, this is a chasm that is hard to cross.

In the past three years, the mode of Chinese auto export was simple: domestic production, Ro-Ro ship transport, overseas sales, light assets, fast turnover, high growth. But now, this road is being broken one by one by global trade barriers. Thailand requires 1:2 capacity betting, EU requires localization production to avoid tariffs, Brazil also taxes CKD/SKD assembly.
From 'complete vehicle export' to 'localization production' means Chinese automakers need to build factories in unfamiliar countries, hire workers, manage supply chains, adapt to local regulations, handle labor relations. This is no longer just an upgrade of the car selling mode, but a reconstruction of localization capabilities.
BYD builds factories in Hungary, Thailand, Brazil; Chery holds 40% stake in Spanish EBRO joint venture; SAIC plans to invest about 200 million Euros to build a factory in Spain. Obviously top players are already acting, but the question is, not all automakers have the ability to build factories overseas.
Those SME brands that exported tens of thousands of vehicles in those years, neither had enough funds to build factories overseas, nor did they have enough technology output capabilities. The 'complete vehicle export' model they relied on is being blocked by policy. When the door of complete vehicle export closes, they have no point to land even if they want to climb the wall.
Besides, the most important point for Chinese cars going overseas is not to take the domestic fierce competition out synchronously. Price wars in the domestic market lasted three years, industry average net profit margin is only 3.2%. Some automakers' thinking inertia is how they roll domestically, they roll the same overseas.
But the logic of the overseas market is completely different. In Southeast Asia, low-price strategy triggered joint boycotts by local industry associations. 10 Thai automotive industry associations jointly submitted 8 urgent policy suggestions to the government, calling for raising localization rate requirements, promoting technology transfer. In Europe, the essence of the 'Price Commitment' mechanism is to force Chinese cars to raise prices.
Taking involution out will only accelerate the upgrade of policy barriers. If you want to explore the market using domestic involution methods, the ultimate result will be digging your own grave.
Back to the original question, the wind direction of going overseas is changing this year. Is this just a breeze, or will it evolve into a destructive hurricane?
The answer is definitely changed, but what remains unchanged is this ultimate proposition of going overseas. The variable factor to consider is how to go overseas.
The export in the past three years was essentially trade-type export. This model relies on three premises: the first is policy openness of target markets, second is cost-performance advantage of Chinese manufacturing, third is free flow of global trade. But now, these three premises are all shaking.
Thailand is tightening, EU is building walls, Brazil is raising taxes, US is blocking. Global major auto markets are using policy means to force Chinese automakers to shift from 'trade-type export' to building locally, producing locally, selling locally, paying taxes locally. This door is closing, but not yet locked. Those who can jump over this wall are not those companies that only sell cheap cars, but those Chinese automakers with the ability to build globally, manage supply chains, and uphold brands.
The export number of 4.059 million vehicles in the first half of 2026, will it become the peak of this era or a starting point? It depends on whether Chinese cars can find a clear direction on the node from 'selling to the whole world' to 'making in the whole world'. After all, this road is much longer than imagined, and also harder to walk.