Chinese Cars Going Global: The Real Challenge Is What Happens After Sales

At the 2026 Bangkok International Motor Show, Chinese brands once again took center stage. BYD, SAIC MG, and Changan Deepal led the Chinese contingent to top the rankings; among the top ten sales, only Toyota and Honda were Japanese brands. Japanese publication DiamondOnline used the headline "Shocking" to describe the changes occurring in the traditional heartland of Japanese cars.

Looking solely at sales figures, this seems like another story of Chinese new energy vehicles breaching the moat built by Japanese cars. However, while Chinese brands are still breaking order records, the challenge posed by the Thai market has shifted direction.

After the Honeymoon, Talk of Daily Realities Begins

Several years ago, the primary question for Thailand's new energy vehicle industry was "who is willing to come". To stimulate the NEV industry, the Thai government successively launched EV3.0 and EV3.5 support policies, offering significant concessions on import tariffs, consumption taxes, and vehicle purchase subsidies. Chinese automakers such as SAIC, BYD, Great Wall, Changan, and GAC followed suit and entered the market densely, successively completing sales channel construction and localized capacity layout.

Now, as the "honeymoon period" of industry introduction ends, the relationship between the two sides has begun to settle into the reality of daily operations. Thailand is concerned about another question: After coming, what can actually be left behind?

According to the EV3.5 policy, companies enjoying relevant import concessions must compensate with local production: for every 1 car imported in 2026, 2 cars must be produced in Thailand; if extended to 2027, the ratio increases to 1:3. The Thailand Board of Investment further promoted the use of local parts this year. For pure electric vehicle projects to obtain additional tax incentives, the proportion of local parts value must be at least 40%, and "Made in Thailand" certification must be obtained.

It's not just localization requirements on the production side; regulatory reach is also extending to after-sales.

In June, the Thai Cabinet approved the "Liability Law for Defective Products", locally known as the "Lemon Law", aiming to lower the burden of proof threshold for consumers in product quality disputes. The draft clarifies that if a defect is found within one year of vehicle delivery, it is presumed that a problem existed at the time of delivery. Consumers have the right to request repairs, replacement, or even refunds.

Although the "Lemon Law" is not specifically targeted at the automotive industry, nor does it specifically target Chinese brands, Chinese new energy vehicles are precisely the field of most concern in this legislation.

Thailand did not suddenly change its attitude towards Chinese new energy vehicles; precisely because the first stage of investment attraction and market cultivation has yielded results, it now begins to demand returns for the next stage - not just sales figures, but also factories, supply chains, employment, and responsibility for long-term operation.

This anxiety did not arise from nothing. In August this year, during a seminar on electric vehicle consumer rights protection by the Thailand Development Research Institute, the case of Neta Auto was specifically mentioned. After the brand's parent company fell into an operational crisis, Thai car owners successively encountered problems such as parts shortages, extended repair cycles, suspension of some service outlets, and vague warranty responsibilities. There are approximately 25,000 Neta Auto vehicles in the Thai market. As of June this year, over 220 consumers have filed complaints with local rights protection organizations.

Neta Auto's situation naturally cannot represent all Chinese automakers, but it adds an extra layer of anxiety for all Thai consumers when choosing Chinese new energy vehicles. When the expansion speed of Chinese car brands outpaces the maturity of after-sales, parts, and channel systems, the risk often does not explode at the time of purchase, but gradually manifests during the long period of vehicle usage.

The Hardest Thing for Japanese Cars to Replicate

Is the Ten Years After They Are Sold

This is exactly the barrier that Japanese automakers find hardest to surpass in Thailand - it is never the product capabilities of a single model.

What Chinese cars are best at is quickly producing a competitive new car. Relying on price, configurations, and smart experiences, Chinese cars are redefining the car-buying standards of the Thai market.

What Japanese brands leave behind after operating in Thailand for decades is "the life of a car ten years after it is sold": there are repair outlets if an accident happens, parts have stable supply channels, there is relatively mature valuation when entering the used car market a few years later, and dealers, financial institutions, and suppliers have also formed long-term business networks around these vehicles.

The Japanese industry's judgment on this Sino-Japanese competition is also shifting. Japanese financial business media THAIBIZ proposed in May this year when discussing "whether Japanese momentum can counterattack" that Chinese brands still lead in product development speed and price competitiveness. But the competition in the Thai auto market in the future will also include long-term capabilities such as local production, supply chains, and policy adaptation, which are precisely the advantages accumulated by Japanese enterprises over the years.

This does not mean Chinese brands cannot fill the gaps. As the earliest Chinese automaker to deeply penetrate the Thai market, SAIC MG entered Thailand over ten years ago, and has already built a sales service system distributed nationwide. Currently, the number of authorized dealers and service outlets has reached 126. The Chonburi Province production base has achieved localized mass production of multiple pure electric models. Factories, stores, and after-sales centers are all expanding in sync with the market size.

This may be the real challenge faced by Chinese automakers after entering the next stage in Thailand: no longer just proving the product is good enough or the price is low enough, but convincing consumers that in a few years, if the car breaks there will still be people to fix it, parts can still be found, vehicles entering the used car market will still have people willing to take over, and today's stores sprouted everywhere will not disappear rapidly with market fluctuations.

Thailand Is Also Asking a "Ten-Year Question"

Looking deeper, what the Thai government truly cares about is not just whether there will be anyone to fix a car ten years later, but more importantly, after the high-speed growth of new energy vehicle sales, how much of the relevant industrial capability will truly remain in Thailand.

In May this year, 10 industrial organizations including the Thai EV Association and the Auto Parts Manufacturers Association jointly urged adjustments to EV support policies. One of the core concerns is that Chinese EV enterprise entry speed is fast, but the driving effect on the local supply chain is limited.

Localization production is far from simply moving factories over. A survey by the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) on Chinese EV enterprises in Thailand this year shows that the cost of producing electric vehicles locally in Thailand is about 20% higher than in China. The root cause is that the local supply chain maturity is insufficient, and core components are still highly dependent on imports from China.

This is the deep logic behind Thailand's recent series of policy adjustments. It is not about taking sides between Chinese and Japanese automakers, but rather at the intersection of the new energy vehicle industry changing lanes, to guard its own industrial status as the "Detroit of Southeast Asia".

In a sense, Thailand's approach is very similar to Hefei, known for industrial investment attraction: seizing the window of technological iteration, not satisfied with companies setting up and products selling well, but wanting to truly accumulate the industrial capabilities of the next generation of automobiles.

Therefore, the "going out" capability demonstrated by Chinese automobiles in the past few years, which is world-class, is only part of globalization. Thailand is now assessing whether Chinese automobiles have a world-class "staying" capability.

The order list of the Bangkok Motor Show will be revealed on the last day of the show. Whoever makes it into the top ten will be announced on the spot.

But the cycle of another report card is much longer: Are the new cars ordered today convenient to maintain in a few years? Is the residual value stable? Is the service network still solid? Looking further ahead, of the factories and capacity that have completed local layout today, how much can truly integrate into the local industrial ecosystem?

This slow report card can better test a Chinese automaker's true global capability.