On one hand, the list of casualties keeps growing; on the other, "revival" acts keep unfolding — a bizarre yet fantastical drama is playing out in reality in the Chinese automotive industry.
According to statistics, at the peak of the car-making boom, hundreds of companies crossed over to enter the market. By May 2026, 23 have entered bankruptcy, liquidation, or complete suspension. Industry insiders' judgment is even more direct: Of the more than 100 new energy brands on sale in the previous two years, only a dozen or so might remain by 2030.
Clearance is a fact happening in this industry. But as this "death list" keeps lengthening, Nezha Auto welcomed "revival" with 3 billion yuan in restructuring investment — A car company that ceased production for nearly two years and owes 26 billion yuan has been pulled back to the table by capital.

From sales champion to complete suspension, Nezha Auto took less than two years.
In 2022, Nezha Auto topped the new car-making forces sales champion with 152,100 units, overpowering "Weilai, Xpeng, and Li Auto", becoming the first new force brand to break through 150,000 annual sales. Supporting this achievement were the 100,000-level Nezha V and the 150,000-level Nezha U — the former contributed 98,900 units annually, accounting for 65%, while the latter accounted for over 30%. The "surrounding cities from the countryside" downward strategy combined with an entry-level product matrix allowed Nezha Auto to quickly become a market-recognized "dark horse".
In the overseas market, it was equally outstanding. In 2024, Nezha achieved an annual sales volume of 7,969 units in Thailand with just two models, ranking third in global new energy vehicle brand sales and first among new forces in Thailand, with a share of the market segment reaching 11.4%. At that time, Nezha held a good hand: Complete double car-making qualifications, mass production capacity at the 150,000-unit level, first-mover channels in the Southeast Asian market, and a stock user base exceeding 400,000.

However, after the peak, the collapse came very quickly. In July 2022, Nezha launched the Nezha S, a mid-to-high-end sedan carrying brand elevation aspirations, with prices reaching up to over 300,000 yuan. However, the new car's 400V charging technology was two generations behind competitors, and the infotainment chip computing power was only 1/3 of competitors'. Since deliveries started in late November of that year, only 2,205 units were delivered annually; the Nezha GT launched in 2023 also fell flat, with 7,092 units delivered annually, with monthly sales peaking at only 2,277 units, far short of the 5,000 units monthly sales expectation.
While failing to break through to the high end, the 100,000-yuan level base was also quickly eroded by competitors: "latercomers" like BYD Seagull and Wuling Bingo invaded aggressively with stronger brand power and higher configurations, causing Nezha Auto to instantly fall into a predicament of having no support on either side.

Sales data clearly recorded the fall: In 2023, Nezha Auto's annual sales were 127,500 units, a 16% year-on-year decline, completing only 51% of the 250,000-unit goal, becoming the only "top new force" driving in reverse. In 2024, sales plummeted to 64,500 units, a 49.37% drop from the previous year, shrinking nearly 60% compared to the 2022 peak. By December 2024, domestic retail sales were only 237 units, down 88.89% year-on-year.
More shocking than sales was the loss: For a long time, Nezha Auto maintained its scale by "losing money on every car sold." Data shows that from 2021 to 2023, Hozon New Energy cumulative net losses reached as high as 18.3 billion yuan, losing over 80,000 yuan per car sold on average. Funds from 10 financing rounds totaling 22.8 billion yuan were almost burned through, and the capital chain completely broke.

According to a normal industry script, Nezha Auto's story should have ended by 2025: production suspension, debt, bankruptcy reorganization; next would be asset liquidation, qualification revocation, slowly being forgotten. But Nezha Auto, nevertheless, staged a "revival".
The reason is not hard to explain: Nezha holds a car-making "double qualification". It is reported that since the approval gate closed in 2017, for new players to make cars, the only path is to acquire an existing "shell". According to regulations, Nezha must produce at least 2,000 cars within 2026, otherwise the qualification faces revocation. There are only three months left until the end of the year. Therefore, the purpose behind the 3 billion yuan restructuring funds is not to sell cars, nor after-sales, but to get the production line running before the end of the year to keep the license.

However, such a script is not unfamiliar. WM Motor and HiPhi have both staged it: In 2025, WM Motor high-profile announced a revival, promising an initial investment of 1 billion yuan, planning 100,000 units annual production and sales in 2026. But the result waited for was that in June 2026, car machines completely paralyzed, the official APP could not be logged into, promised funds were not actually paid, and the revival plan failed substantially; HiPhi, on the other hand, the new investors who announced taking over did not even pay the deposit, negotiations stalled until April 2026 when the court approved the restructuring plan, and at this time nearly a year had passed since it announced "revival". Money didn't arrive, negotiations stopped, the script was finished, leaving only a shell in place.

Now, what Nezha is walking on seems to be the same path.
And behind this lies a cruel reality: The two words "revival" sound like hope, but in fact it is a deeper helplessness; it never saves the car company itself, but a license plate, a new story for the capital market to hear. As for whether Nezha's 400,000 owners can get their cars repaired, whether suppliers' debts can be recovered, whether creditors' 12% repayment rate can be fulfilled, these problems that need solving, not one has been solved.
Those who should exit cannot exit, those who should be cleared cannot be cleared, no one is responsible for those who should be responsible. This is not a reversal of destiny for a car company, but another proof of the failure of the entire industry's clearance mechanism. And Nezha Auto will not be the last "reviver".