In the Malaysian SUV market, many buyers compare Toyota Harrier and Mercedes-Benz GLC when choosing a car. These two cars are quite close in price and positioning. Today, we will make a detailed comparison from multiple aspects to help you save time on research.
Toyota Harrier's OTR price in Malaysia is RM 289,000 - 289,000, with a total of 1 version, including 2026 HEV 2.5L Standard (RM 289,000), etc.
Mercedes-Benz GLC's OTR price in Malaysia is RM 336,888 - 336,888, with a total of 2 versions, including GLC 200 (RM 290,000), GLC 300 (RM 340,000), etc.
From a price perspective, Toyota Harrier's starting price is indeed RM 47,888 cheaper than Mercedes-Benz GLC. If your budget is limited, Toyota's entry-level version can already meet daily needs. However, also note that the cheaper few thousand might involve compromises in features, depending on your specific needs.

Toyota Harrier's safety rating is 5★ (ASEAN NCAP), active safety systems include Brand ADAS.
Mercedes-Benz GLC's safety rating is 5★ (Euro NCAP), active safety systems include Premium ADAS.
Regarding safety features, both cars received good ratings. However, Toyota Harrier's Brand ADAS and Mercedes-Benz GLC's Premium ADAS have some differences in functionality. If you value active safety, you can compare the function lists of both carefully.

Toyota Harrier body length is 4400 mm, trunk 400 L.
Mercedes-Benz GLC body length is 4400 mm, trunk 400 L.
The dimensions of both cars are almost the same, and the interior space is not much different. For cars in this class, it is fully sufficient for daily use.

Toyota Harrier and Mercedes-Benz GLC are both mainstream choices in the Malaysian market, suitable for family use and daily commuting. If you value brand reputation and resale price more, you can prioritize the one with better reputation; if you care more about cost-performance and features, then choose the one with richer configurations. Ultimately, it is recommended to test drive both, as personal experience is the most important.
Overall, Toyota Harrier and Mercedes-Benz GLC are both very good models in the Malaysian market. Which one to choose depends on your personal needs and budget. It is recommended that everyone do their research, compare quotes from multiple car dealerships, and then test drive to make the final decision. Buying a car is a major decision, spending time on research will never be wrong.

In the SUV market in Malaysia, many buyers compare Toyota Harrier and Mercedes-Benz GLC when choosing a car. These two models are quite close in price and positioning, so today we will make a detailed comparison from multiple aspects to help you save time on research.
Toyota Harrier's OTR price in Malaysia is RM 289,000 - 289,000, with a total of 1 version, including 2026 HEV 2.5L Standard (RM 289,000), etc.
Mercedes-Benz GLC's OTR price in Malaysia is RM 336,888 - 336,888, with a total of 2 versions, including GLC 200 (RM 290,000), GLC 300 (RM 340,000), etc.
From a price perspective, Toyota Harrier's starting price is indeed RM 47,888 cheaper than Mercedes-Benz GLC. If your budget is limited, Toyota's entry-level version can already meet daily needs. However, also note that the few thousand dollars saved might involve trade-offs in features, depending on your specific needs.

Toyota Harrier body length 4400 mm, trunk 400 L.
Mercedes-Benz GLC body length 4400 mm, trunk 400 L.
The dimensions of the two cars are almost the same, and the interior space difference is not significant. Cars in this class are more than sufficient for daily use.

Toyota Harrier warranty 5 years/unlimited mileage, service interval every 10,000km or 6 months.
Mercedes-Benz GLC warranty 3 years/100,000km, service interval every 10,000km or 6 months.

Both Toyota Harrier and Mercedes-Benz GLC are mainstream choices in the Malaysian market, suitable for family use and daily commuting. If you value brand reputation and resale value more, prioritize the one with the better reputation; if you care more about value for money and features, choose the one with more comprehensive configuration. Ultimately, it is recommended to test drive both, as personal experience is the most important.
Overall, Toyota Harrier and Mercedes-Benz GLC are both excellent models in the Malaysian market. Which one to choose depends on your personal needs and budget. We suggest doing your research, comparing quotes from several dealerships, and then test driving to make the final decision. Buying a car is a big matter, spending some time doing research will never go wrong.

In the Malaysian SUV market, many buyers will compare the Toyota Harrier and Mercedes-Benz GLB when choosing a car. These two cars are quite close in price and positioning. Today we will do a detailed comparison from multiple aspects to help you save time on research.
The Toyota Harrier's OTR price in Malaysia is RM 289,000 - 289,000. There is a total of 1 version, including the 2026 HEV 2.5L Standard (RM 289,000), among others.
The Mercedes-Benz GLB's OTR price in Malaysia is RM 299,888 - 352,888. There is a total of 1 version, including the Standard (RM 299,888), among others.
From a price perspective, the Toyota Harrier's starting price is indeed RM 10,888 cheaper than the Mercedes-Benz GLB. If your budget is limited, the Toyota entry-level version can already meet daily needs. However, note that the cheaper price by a few thousand might involve trade-offs in features, depending on your specific needs.

The Toyota Harrier is equipped with a 2.0L Turbo, 220 hp. Official fuel consumption is 9.5 L/100km.
The Mercedes-Benz GLB is equipped with a 2.0L Turbo, 220 hp. Official fuel consumption is 9.5 L/100km.
Both cars use the same powertrain, the driving feel is basically no difference in daily use. Fuel consumption is also similar, no need to fuss too much about this point.

The Toyota Harrier's safety rating is 5★ (ASEAN NCAP). Active safety systems include Brand ADAS.
The Mercedes-Benz GLB's safety rating is 5★ (Euro NCAP). Active safety systems include Premium ADAS.
In terms of safety features, both cars have received good ratings. However, there are some differences in functionality between the Toyota Harrier's Brand ADAS and the Mercedes-Benz GLB's Premium ADAS. If you value active safety, you can compare the feature lists of both in detail.

The Toyota Harrier body length is 4400 mm, trunk 400 L.
The Mercedes-Benz GLB body length is 4400 mm, trunk 400 L.
The dimensions of both cars are almost the same, and there is not much difference in interior space. For this class of car, it is more than enough for daily use.

Both the Toyota Harrier and Mercedes-Benz GLB are mainstream choices in the Malaysian market, suitable for family use and daily commuting. If you value brand reputation and resale value more, you can prioritize the one with a better reputation. If you care more about cost-effectiveness and features, choose the one with richer specifications. Ultimately, it is recommended to test drive both; experiencing it firsthand is the most important.

Overall, both the Toyota Harrier and Mercedes-Benz GLB are very good models in the Malaysian market. Which one to choose mainly depends on your personal needs and budget. It is recommended to do your research, compare quotes from several dealerships, and then go for a test drive to make the final decision. Buying a car is a big matter; spending time on research will never go wrong.

Pada pasaran SUV di Malaysia, ramai pembeli yang akan membandingkan Toyota Harrier dan Mercedes-Benz GLE semasa memilih kereta. Kedua-dua kereta ini agak hampir dari segi harga dan penentuan, hari ini kita akan buat perbandingan terperinci dari pelbagai aspek, membantu anda menjimatkan masa membuat kajian.
Toyota Harrier di Malaysia dijual pada harga OTR RM 289,000 - 289,000, terdapat 1 varian, termasuk 2026 HEV 2.5L Standard (RM 289,000) dan lain-lain.
Mercedes-Benz GLE di Malaysia dijual pada harga OTR RM 544,888 - 544,888, terdapat 1 varian, termasuk Standard (RM 544,888) dan lain-lain.
Dari segi harga, Toyota Harrier memang lebih murah bermula dari RM 255,888 berbanding Mercedes-Benz GLE. Jika bajet anda terhad, versi masuk Toyota sudah cukup untuk keperluan harian. Namun perlu berhati-hati, beberapa ribu ringgit yang lebih murah, mungkin ada pengorbanan dari segi kelengkapan, bergantung pada keperluan anda.

Toyota Harrier dilengkapi enjin Turbo 2.0L, kuasa 220 hp. Penggunaan bahan api rasmi 9.5 L/100km.
Mercedes-Benz GLE dilengkapi enjin Turbo 3.0L, kuasa 350 hp. Penggunaan bahan api rasmi 12.0 L/100km.
Dari segi kuasa, Turbo 3.0L Mercedes-Benz GLE mempunyai 130 kuasa kuda lebih daripada Turbo 2.0L Toyota Harrier. Namun untuk penggunaan harian di bandar, kuasa kedua-dua kereta sudah cukup, tidak akan rasa kurang kuasa.

Paras keselamatan Toyota Harrier ialah 5★ (ASEAN NCAP), sistem keselamatan aktif termasuk Brand ADAS.
Paras keselamatan Mercedes-Benz GLE ialah 5★ (Euro NCAP), sistem keselamatan aktif termasuk Premium ADAS.
Dari segi peralatan keselamatan, kedua-dua kereta mendapat paraf yang baik. Namun Toyota Harrier Brand ADAS dan Mercedes-Benz GLE Premium ADAS mempunyai perbezaan dalam fungsi, jika anda lebih mengutamakan keselamatan aktif, boleh bandingkan senarai fungsi kedua-duanya.

Toyota Harrier panjang kenderaan 4400 mm, ruang bagasi 400 L.
Mercedes-Benz GLE panjang kenderaan 4400 mm, ruang bagasi 400 L.
Ukuran kedua-dua kereta hampir sama, ruang dalam kereta tidak banyak beza. Kereta pada tahap ini, penggunaan harian sudah cukup.

Toyota Harrier jaminan 5 tahun/jarak tanpa had, selang penyelenggaraan setiap 10,000km atau 6 bulan.
Mercedes-Benz GLE jaminan 3 tahun/100,000km, selang penyelenggaraan setiap 10,000km atau 6 bulan.

Secara keseluruhannya, Toyota Harrier dan Mercedes-Benz GLE adalah model kereta yang sangat baik di pasaran Malaysia. Memilih yang mana, bergantung kepada keperluan dan bajet peribadi anda. Cadangan, buat kajian terlebih dahulu, bandingkan sebut harga di beberapa pengedar, kemudian buat ujian memandu untuk keputusan akhir. Membeli kereta adalah perkara besar, luangkan masa membuat kajian pasti tidak salah.

Di pasaran SUV Malaysia, ramai pembeli yang membandingkan Toyota Harrier dan Mercedes-Benz GLB semasa memilih kereta. Kedua-dua kereta ini hampir sama dari segi harga dan kategori, hari ini kita akan buat perbandingan terperinci dari pelbagai aspek, membantu anda menjimatkan masa mencari maklumat.
Harga OTR Toyota Harrier di Malaysia ialah RM 289,000 - 289,000, terdapat 1 varian, termasuk 2026 HEV 2.5L Standard (RM 289,000) dan lain-lain.
Harga OTR Mercedes-Benz GLB di Malaysia ialah RM 299,888 - 352,888, terdapat 1 varian, termasuk Standard (RM 299,888) dan lain-lain.
Dari segi harga, harga permulaan Toyota Harrier memang lebih murah RM 10,888 daripada Mercedes-Benz GLB. Jika anda mempunyai bajet terhad, varian asas Toyota sudah boleh memenuhi keperluan harian. Tetapi perlu diingat, ribuan ringgit yang lebih murah ini mungkin mempunyai kompromi dari segi kelengkapan, bergantung pada keperluan anda.

Pengelasan keselamatan Toyota Harrier ialah 5★ (ASEAN NCAP), sistem keselamatan aktif termasuk Brand ADAS.
Pengelasan keselamatan Mercedes-Benz GLB ialah 5★ (Euro NCAP), sistem keselamatan aktif termasuk Premium ADAS.
Dari segi kelengkapan keselamatan, kedua-dua kereta mendapat pengelasan yang baik. Namun Brand ADAS pada Toyota Harrier dan Premium ADAS pada Mercedes-Benz GLB mempunyai perbezaan dalam fungsi, jika anda mengutamakan keselamatan aktif, anda boleh bandingkan senarai fungsi kedua-duanya dengan teliti.

Panjang badan Toyota Harrier 4400 mm, bakul bagasi 400 L.
Panjang badan Mercedes-Benz GLB 4400 mm, bakul bagasi 400 L.
Saiz kedua-dua kereta hampir sama, perbezaan ruang dalaman tidak banyak. Kereta dalam tahap ini, penggunaan harian sudah cukup.

Toyota Harrier jaminan 5 tahun / tiada had jarak, selang servis setiap 10,000 km atau 6 bulan.
Mercedes-Benz GLB jaminan 3 tahun / 100,000 km, selang servis setiap 10,000 km atau 6 bulan.

Toyota Harrier dan Mercedes-Benz GLB adalah pilihan utama pasaran Malaysia, sesuai untuk kegunaan keluarga, perjalanan harian. Jika anda lebih mengutamakan reputasi jenama dan harga siri kedua, anda boleh berikan keutamaan kepada model yang lebih terkenal; jika anda lebih mementingkan nilai dan kelengkapan, pilih yang lebih kaya dengan ciri-ciri. Akhir sekali disyorkan untuk kedua-dua model diuji jalan, pengalaman sendiri adalah yang paling penting.

Secara keseluruhannya, Toyota Harrier dan Mercedes-Benz GLB adalah model yang sangat baik di pasaran Malaysia. Memilih mana satu, yang utama bergantung pada keperluan dan bajet peribadi anda. Kami mengesyorkan anda membuat penyelidikan terlebih dahulu, bandingkan pelbagai sebut harga pengedar kereta, kemudian buat keputusan akhir selepas uji jalan. Membeli kereta adalah perkara besar, meluangkan masa membuat penyelidikan tidak akan salah.

喺馬來西亞嘅 SUV 市場,好多買家喺揀嘅時候都會拿 Toyota Harrier 同 Mercedes-Benz GLE 嚟比較。这两款车喺價位同定位上都好接近,今日我就由多個方面做一个詳細嘅比較,幫你慳返做功課嘅時間。
Toyota Harrier 喺馬來西亞嘅 OTR 售價係 RM 289,000 - 289,000,一共有 1 個版本,包括 2026 HEV 2.5L Standard(RM 289,000) 等。
Mercedes-Benz GLE 喺馬來西亞嘅 OTR 售價係 RM 544,888 - 544,888,一共有 1 個版本,包括 Standard(RM 544,888) 等。
由價錢嚟睇,Toyota Harrier 嘅起步價真係比 Mercedes-Benz GLE 平咗 RM 255,888。如果你預算有限,Toyota 嘅入門版已經可以滿足日常需求。但要留意,平嗰幾千蚊,可能喺配備上會有取捨,具體要睇你嘅需求。

Toyota Harrier 車身長 4400 mm,車尾箱 400 L。
Mercedes-Benz GLE 車身長 4400 mm,車尾箱 400 L。
兩款車嘅尺寸幾近一樣,車廂空間差別唔大。呢個級別嘅車,日常使用完全夠用。

Toyota Harrier 採用 FWD 驅動方式。
Mercedes-Benz GLE 採用 FWD 驅動方式。
兩款車嘅驅動方式一樣,都係 FWD,日常駕駛感受唔會有太大分別。

Toyota Harrier 同 Mercedes-Benz GLE 都係馬來西亞市場嘅主流選擇,適合家庭使用、日常通勤。如果你更重視品牌口碑同二手價,可以優先考慮口碑更好嗰款;如果你更在意性價比同配備,就揀配備更豐富嗰款。最終都係建議兩款都去試車,親身體驗先至最重要。

總體嚟講,Toyota Harrier 同 Mercedes-Benz GLE 都係馬來西亞市場幾唔錯嘅車型。揀邊一輛,關鍵仲要睇你嘅個人需求同預算。建議大家做足功課,多比較幾間車行嘅報價,先至去試車做最終決定。買車係件大事,花少少時間做功課絕對唔會錯。

喺馬來西亞嘅 SUV 市場,好多買家喺揀車嘅時候都會拿 豐田 Harrier 同 梅賽德斯 - 賓士 GLE 嚟做比較。這兩款車喺價位同定位上都幾接近,今日我哋就從多個方面做一個詳細嘅對比,幫你省咗做功課嘅時間。
豐田 Harrier 喺馬來西亞嘅 OTR 售價係 RM 289,000 - 289,000,一共有 1 個版本,包括 2026 HEV 2.5L Standard(RM 289,000)等。
梅賽德斯 - 賓士 GLE 喺馬來西亞嘅 OTR 售價係 RM 544,888 - 544,888,一共有 1 個版本,包括 Standard(RM 544,888)等。
從價錢嚟睇,豐田 Harrier 嘅起步價確實比 梅賽德斯 - 賓士 GLE 平咗 RM 255,888。如果你預算有限,豐田嘅入門版已經可以滿足日常需求。但都要注意,平嗰幾千蚊,可能喺配備上會有取舍,具體要睇你嘅需求。

豐田 Harrier 嘅安全評級係 5★ (ASEAN NCAP),主動安全系統包括 豐田 ADAS。
梅賽德斯 - 賓士 GLE 嘅安全評級係 5★ (Euro NCAP),主動安全系統包括 高級 ADAS。
安全配備方面,兩款車都拿到唔錯嘅評級。不過 豐田 Harrier 嘅 豐田 ADAS 同 梅賽德斯 - 賓士 GLE 嘅 高級 ADAS 喺功能上有少少分別,如果你比較睇重主動安全嘅話,可以仔細對比下兩者嘅功能列表。

豐田 Harrier 車身長 4400 mm,行李廂 400 L。
梅賽德斯 - 賓士 GLE 車身長 4400 mm,行李廂 400 L。
兩款車嘅尺寸幾乎一樣,車內空間差別唔大。呢個級別嘅車,日常使用完全足夠。

豐田 Harrier 同 梅賽德斯 - 賓士 GLE 都係馬來西亞市場嘅主流選擇,適合家庭使用、日常通勤。如果你更睇重品牌口碑同二手價,可以優先考慮口碑更好嗰一款;如果你更在意性價比同配備,就揀配備更豐富嗰款。最終都係建議兩款都去試駕,親身體驗先係最重要嘅。

總嚟講,豐田 Harrier 同 梅賽德斯 - 賓士 GLE 都係馬來西亞市場幾好嘅車型。揀邊輛,關鍵仲要睇你嘅個人需求同預算。大家建議做好功課,多比較幾間車行嘅報價,再去試駕做最終決定。買車係件大事,花點時間做功課絕對唔會錯。


貓頭鷹車志(ID:owlauto)消息,近日,愛瑪科技公佈咗 2026 年三季報告。數據顯示,前三季度公司實現咗營業收入 183.89 億元,同比下跌 12.82%;歸母淨利潤 11.04 億元,同比下跌 42.13%;扣非歸母淨利潤 9.69 億元,同比跌幅達 47.18%。第三季度單季營收 69.49 億元,同比下跌 13.81%;歸母淨利潤 4.39 億元,同比下跌 36.86%,利潤跌幅較上半年有所收窄,但仍未走出低谷。

利潤下滑幅度明顯大於收入跌幅,主要原因在於新國標實施後單車合規成本剛性上升。新版《電動自行車安全技術規範》(GB 17761—2024)於 2025 年 9 月正式實施,對防火阻燃、防篡改、北斗定位、產品一致性等提出更高要求,3C 認證項目從 38 項擴充至 112 項,單車硬件成本增加數百元。愛瑪喺財報中表示,公司階段性承擔咗部分成本壓力,疊加銷量波動與剛性費用支出,當期盈利受到較大影響。數據顯示,公司第三季度毛利率為 16.79%,同比下降 1.21 個百分點;淨利率僅 6.49%,同比驟降 2.32 個百分點。
不過,三季報告中也並非冇積極嘅信號。最值得關注嘅係經營業務現金流嘅大幅改善,前三季度經營業務現金流淨額 18.27 億元,雖同比下降 67.20%,但較上半年 6.01 億元嘅淨流出已明顯回正,第三季度單季經營業務現金流約 24.3 億元,說明供應鏈結算與渠道回款節奏正在恢復。銷量端同樣出現積極變化,奧維雲網監測顯示國內電動兩輪車內銷第三季度單季已實現嘅同比回正;出口則提供另一條增長線索,海關總署數據顯示前三季度電動兩輪車累計出口 72.6 億美元,同比增長 37.8%,南美洲與非洲市場分別增長 51.3% 和 44.5%,愛瑪印尼、越南工廠已投產,但境外收入佔比仍處於較低水平,出海對整體業績拉動尚需時日。
綜合來看,愛瑪科技當前雖然正面臨住一定嘅挑戰,但經營現金流轉正、行業需求企穩、出口高增、海外產能落地等積極因素,亦正為下階段積蓄條件,公司 2027 年淨利潤或有望迎來明顯回升,只係實際成績單究竟會係如何,仍須繼續關注。

喺馬來西亞嘅 SUV 市場,好買家喺揀車嘅時候都會拎 Toyota Harrier 同 Mercedes-Benz GLC 嚟比較。呢兩部車喺價位同定位上都幾接近嘅,今日我哋就從多方面做一个詳細嘅比較,幫你慳番做功課嘅時間。
Toyota Harrier 喺馬來西亞嘅 OTR 售價係 RM 289,000 - 289,000,總共有 1 個版本,包括 2026 HEV 2.5L Standard(RM 289,000) 等。
Mercedes-Benz GLC 喺馬來西亞嘅 OTR 售價係 RM 336,888 - 336,888,總共有 2 個版本,包括 GLC 200(RM 290,000)、GLC 300(RM 340,000) 等。
從價錢嚟睇,Toyota Harrier 嘅入門價確實比 Mercedes-Benz GLC 平咗 RM 47,888。如果你預算有限,Toyota 嘅入門版已經可以滿足日常需要。但都要留意,平嗰啲幾千蚊,可能喺配備上會有取捨,具體就要睇你嘅需要。

Toyota Harrier 配備 2.0L Turbo,馬力 220 hp。官方油耗 9.5 L/100km。
Mercedes-Benz GLC 配備 2.0L Turbo,馬力 220 hp。官方油耗 9.5 L/100km。
兩部車用緊同一套動力系統,日常開起嚟嘅感受基本冇分別。油耗方面都相若,唔使太糾結呢一點。

Toyota Harrier 車身長 4400 mm,尾箱 400 L。
Mercedes-Benz GLC 車身長 4400 mm,尾箱 400 L。
兩部車嘅尺寸幾乎一樣,車內空間分別唔大。呢個級別嘅車,日常用完全夠用。

Toyota Harrier 保養期 5 年/無限制里程,保養間隔 每 10,000km 或 6 個月。
Mercedes-Benz GLC 保養期 3 年/100,000km,保養間隔 每 10,000km 或 6 個月。
總體嚟講,Toyota Harrier 同 Mercedes-Benz GLC 都係馬來西亞市場幾好嘅車款。揀邊一部,關鍵始終係要睇你嘅個人需要同預算。建議大家做番功課,多比較幾間車行嘅報價,再去試駕做最後決定。買車係件大事,花少少時間做功課絕對唔會錯。


Owl Auto (ID: owlauto) reports that, recently, according to media reports, Ricky Ip, Head of Tesla Asia-Pacific Recruitment, posted on the X platform confirming that Tesla has officially entered the Vietnamese market and simultaneously launched local recruitment. This statement comes just over a month after Tesla quietly completed entity registration in Ho Chi Minh City, meaning the previous speculation on "whether to enter Vietnam" has officially been settled.

According to Owl Auto, Tesla registered "Tesla Motors Vietnam" in Ho Chi Minh City on September 11, 2026, with a registered capital of about 77.7 billion Vietnamese Dong (about $3 million). The business scope covers car import, wholesale, and retail. The positions opened this time include five categories: Sales Manager, Service Manager, HR Business Partner, Procurement Manager, and Charging Project Developer.
Among these, the "Charging Project Developer" position is particularly key—Tesla follows a rhythm of "recruit charging staff first, then launch sales" in Thailand and the Philippines, and the Vietnamese market is likely to replicate the same path to pave the way for Supercharger network localization.
However, Tesla is entering a market firmly controlled by VinFast. In the first nine months of 2026, VinFast delivered a cumulative 177,697 cars in Vietnam, accounting for 36% of the national total new car sales of about 495,000 vehicles. This far exceeds Toyota's 53,978 units and surpasses the combined total of Toyota, Hyundai, Mitsubishi, Ford, and Kia, which stood at 175,136 units.
VinFast has ranked as the best-selling car brand in Vietnam for 25 consecutive months. Its micro electric vehicle model VF 3 secured the first place in cumulative sales for the year with a starting price below $13,000. In terms of charging infrastructure, VinFast affiliate company V-Green operates about 98% of charging ports in Vietnam and plans to add $380 million to build 99 ultra-fast charging stations, forming an infrastructure barrier that Tesla will find difficult to bypass in the short term.
Tesla's challenges go beyond the rival's head start advantage. Vietnam levies tariffs on imported complete vehicles ranging from 47% to 70% depending on the country of origin. In the initial stage, Tesla can almost only enter by exporting complete vehicles from its Shanghai Gigafactory. The tax burden that VinFast does not need to bear is already embedded in the pricing of every vehicle. Fortunately, Vietnam has extended the exemption policy for the first-time registration fee for pure electric vehicles to the end of 2030, and it applies to imported electric vehicles, leaving a certain policy window for Tesla.
Tesla has not yet announced the models, pricing, and store locations in Vietnam; initially, it is more likely to test the waters in the form of imported cars.


朱华荣退居幕后,赵非接手硬骨头。
对于一家拥有160多年工业史,又升格为独立汽车央企的中国汽车巨头而言,核心管理层更迭,绝不是简单的新老交替,总要给国家和资本市场一些交代。
10月16日,长安汽车发布公告,朱华荣卸任该公司董事长及相关职务,将精力全面聚焦于中国长安汽车集团(简称“中国长安”)层面的战略统筹;原总裁赵非接棒,出任长安汽车董事长。
此时,距离中国长安挂牌成立仅过去一年多,距离9月董事会换届也才短短一个月。
「图片来源:长安汽车公告」
短短30天内的两度调整,是长安汽车在经历了国内销量承压与利润失血的阵痛后,对长期模糊的集团与上市公司权责边界,动了一场手术。
在资本市场眼中,长安汽车此次权责厘清只是起点,其新组织架构必须直面市场最严酷的考验,长安汽车拿什么来证明自己能够完成真正的大象转身,带领汽车央企突破困局。
01
上市车企集团核心管理层的变阵,往往与经营层面的现实压力紧密相连。长安汽车今年前三季度的产销数据,正是推动这次调整最直接,也是最迫切的背景。
长安汽车披露的产销快报显示,今年前三季度累计销量为169.27万辆,同比下降18.07%。在《汽车K线》统计在册的17家上市车企中,这个降幅极为刺眼。

同期,上汽集团与比亚迪在超310万辆的庞大基盘上仅是微降,吉利汽车维持3.01%的稳健增长,奇瑞汽车更是以超10%的增速逆势奔跑。
长安汽车不仅是Top5中唯一出现两位数下滑的上市车企,其年初提出的全年330万辆销量目标,完成率也只有51.29%。
虽然今年中国汽车市场大盘不稳,但依然有相当比例的上市车企通过新能源转型和出口,做到基本稳定,甚至稳中有升。
在《汽车K线》看来,比销量下滑更值得警惕的,是盈利能力的衰退。
长安汽车上半年归母净利润8.17亿元,同比下降64.32%;扣非净利润2.51亿元,降幅达83.01%。
刨除汇兑损益、联营合营企业投资收益等非主业因素后,主业实际盈利已薄至单车不足百元的量级;上半年经营现金流净额为-114.13亿元,承压明显。
「图片来源:长安汽车2026半年报」
与此同时,长安汽车产品结构性矛盾同样明显,前三季度其新能源渗透率为41.9%,而同期中汽协数据显示,行业渗透率已站上53.6%。
燃油车基盘在萎缩,新能源接棒的速度也未能达到预期。
02
除此之外,长安汽车的品牌矩阵也是冷暖分明。
长安启源是唯一跑出加速度的品牌,销量同比大涨近80%并实现单季度盈利;深蓝汽车虽然规模站住脚,但增速掉入个位数且财务层面仍未扭亏。
最令人大跌眼镜的是高端品牌阿维塔,前三季度累计交付5.54万辆,同比大幅下滑38.99%,主力车型未能形成持续放量。
相比之下,在15万~25万元价格带,零跑汽车、小米汽车等新势力正以极快的增速蚕食市场份额,长安汽车与不少传统车企一样,正面临着前有堵截、后有追兵的境况。
「图片来源:长安汽车产销快报」
唯一的强支撑来自海外市场。前三季度长安汽车海外累计交付72.97万辆,同比增长56.8%;今年上半年海外毛利率20.13%,远高于国内的11.67%。
但综合来看,《汽车K线》认为,长安汽车目前的困局并非某个单一产品或某一品牌的失手,而是旧基盘的下滑速度、新业务的盈利节奏,以及组织架构对市场变化的响应效率,这三股力量不仅没能形成合力,反而相互掣肘。
03
面对眼下这份略显沉重的成绩单,朱华荣与赵非的这次交接棒的真实用意,也就不难理解。
自去年7月中国长安挂牌一年多以来,朱华荣同时兼任集团和长安汽车董事长,多位高管也在两级主体交叉任职。
这是新央企组建过渡期的必要安排,无可厚非。但当集团体系基本成型之后,交叉兼任的代价开始显现。
决策链条冗长,经营责任模糊,长安汽车在面对瞬息万变的市场时,缺少一个真正对经营结果负全责的前线指挥。

此番调整之后,朱华荣专注集团层面,负责“定战略、配资源、促协同、控风险、强激励”;赵非则以集团总经理身份兼任长安汽车董事长,总裁职位由内部成长起来的叶沛出任。
在《汽车K线》看来,本次人事调整的意图十分明确,即集团管方向,长安汽车拼市场。但纸面上的设计再完美,要让长安汽车的庞大身躯真正跑起来却是另外一回事。
权责厘清之后真正的考验在于,长安汽车是否真的获得了与独立经营相匹配的决策权限和问责机制。
如果不能在机制上真正打破央国企传统的羁绊,此番调整反倒容易陷入另一种形式的迟疑与内耗。
04
从目前的情况看,事情似乎在朝着好的方向发展,起码从长安汽车管理层的表态看,他们已经深刻意识到“效率”二字在目前市场极度内卷条件下的重要性。
在10月16日的媒体沟通会上,朱华荣解释这套新机制时表示,要通过治理变革把原有动辄两个月的决策流程压缩,部分事项审批时效甚至要缩短至1至2小时。

对于走上前台的赵非而言,真正的硬仗已经打响。国内基盘的止跌企稳与海外体系的搭建,哪一头都不能等。
赵非并非没有经历过逆风局。2018年调任长安福特时,他主导的战略调整在2020年实现销量止跌,2021年增幅超过20%。
这段经历证明他具备在压力下发现问题、解决问题的能力。只不过,他当前面对的,是一个远比当年更复杂的棋局。
05
在国内市场,燃油车大盘收缩是行业性的,但对长安汽车而言,其新能源的增长速度,依然没能跑赢自家燃油车基盘的失血速度。
既然外部增量难以迅速补位,长安汽车只能从内部寻找效率与利润提升的空间,加快资源整合。
今年9月底,阿维塔与深蓝汽车成立AD协同发展部,推行“前端独立、中后台协同”模式,预期降低20%至30%的成本。
同时,长安汽车也在彻底厘清品牌定位,将阿维塔锚定30万~50万元新豪华,深蓝汽车聚焦15万~25万元中高端,而长安启源则主攻主流家庭。此外,产品谱系计划从63款精简至36款,集中资源打造全球大单品。

《汽车K线》认为,长安汽车这一方向有先例可循。吉利汽车“一个吉利”战略推进后,2025年行政费用率下降17.1%、核心归母净利润增长36%。
但吉利汽车从启动整合到费用率明显改善,相隔一个完整财年,长安汽车享受到协同红利,大概率也不会来得更快。
所以,赵非手中另一张牌——出海,就显得格外重要。现阶段,单纯依靠整车出口的模式正逼近天花板,欧盟对中国产电动车加征关税让价格竞争力承压。
赵非明确提出,过去“国内打磨完成再输出海外”的模式已不适配,未来要整合全球用户需求打造全球大单品,并把产能推到市场前。
长安汽车的泰国罗勇工厂已开始运营,欧洲基地规划到2028年形成18万辆产能。从产品出海向体系出海跨越,对任何一家中国车企都是全新课题,这需要以年为单位来验证。
06
把视线拉长,长安汽车的处境折射的是中国传统车企转型的共性命题。
它拥有最悠久的历史底蕴,同时又是一家最年轻的汽车央企。
相比比亚迪极致的垂直整合效率与吉利汽车灵活的市场化运作,长安汽车这种大型央国企在决策速度、激励弹性与容错空间等方面的机制差异,并非一次人事调整就能抹平。

面对“十五五”规划的新一轮产业升级要求,长安汽车的破局必须触及根本,要用最年轻的央企机制去打破最厚重的历史惯性。
此次换帅为长安汽车打开了内部机制改革的窗口,但真正决定走向的,是权责厘清能否带来真实的经营自主权,是研发与营销能否拥有更大试错空间,将央企的资源与民企的活力深度融合。
Views of AutosKline:
今年上半年,朱华荣说过一句话:过去是量在先、利在后,从今年开始要量利并重。这句话放在今天的长安汽车身上,比任何时候都更贴切。人事交棒已经完成,这家最悠久的车企,必须以最年轻的央企姿态,在历史包袱与转型阵痛的夹击下完成重塑。
长安汽车一定着急想证明,在销量和利润的双重压力下,一套更清晰、更高效、更贴近市场和全球化的治理结构,能够带领它重新找回增长。 换帅本身不是目的,用换帅来撬动效率、责任和打法的系统性切换,才是它真正想证明的东西。当然,这套新架构最终能不能被证明有效,唯一的裁判是接下来的销量和利润数字。
文字为【汽车K线】原创,内容参考素材源自上市公司公告和行业公开信息(相关公司和机构应有义务对其真实性负责);部分图片来源于网络,版权归原作者所有。
本号文章,未经授权,不得转载,违者必究。同时,文章内容不构成对任何人的投资建议!股市风险大,投资需谨慎!


Written by | Zhang Nan
Edited by | Huang Dalu
Designed by | Zhen Youmei

Chen Binbo, President of the Wuhan Automobile Industry Association and a senior Chinese automotive executive.
In 1987, he entered the Second Automobile Works, experiencing success at Dongfeng Peugeot-Citroën, Fengshen, Dongfeng Nissan, Dongfeng Honda, Minth Group, and Farasis Energy.
His nearly forty-year career spans industrial policy, complete vehicle manufacturing, marketing, global parts, and power batteries. He has witnessed the Chinese automotive industry evolve from planned management and joint venture introduction to independent rise and new energy transition.
On October 14, 2026, in the 20th Anniversary JackTok Special Dialogue 13th Talk of "Automotive Business Review", the two of them looked back on Chen Binbo's career over two hours, and also discussed current issues such as joint venture retreat, price wars, industry cleansing, supply chain globalization, and power battery competition.
Why do choices that were once correct fail as market, technology, and organizational conditions change? When old experience is no longer the standard answer, how does an executive see clearly, accept boundaries, and find their place again amidst change?
The "50 Golden Quotes from Chen Binbo Interview" published with this article are categorized around themes of industrial changes, rise and fall of joint ventures, manufacturing efficiency, industry cleansing, corporate globalization, power batteries, and career choices.
Chen Binbo's WeChat name is "Go Forward Unceasingly". However, the forward movement he understands is not always rushing in the same direction, but still willing to relearn and adjust position after conditions change and old answers fail, continuing to do things that can create value.
Coexisting with change is sometimes not about persisting harder in the original methods, but about moving forward again after seeing the boundaries.

"Is it retirement time now?" At the beginning of the live stream, Jia Ke asked what seemed like a simple question.

Chen Binbo paused for a moment and said, "Not yet fully retired". He works at the industry association, serves as an independent director for several publicly listed companies, and acts as an advisor for enterprises. There are still arrangements every day, just no longer carrying sales and profit indicators.

His WeChat name is "Go Forward Unceasingly". This name easily brings to mind will, speed, and career peaks.
But on October 14, 2026, in the 14th Talk of the "Automotive Business Review" 20th Anniversary JackTok Special Dialogue, the two really talked about how an automotive person admits the environment has changed and rearranges themselves amidst change.

Chen Binbo was born in 1964. He entered the Second Automobile Works (today's Dongfeng Motor) after graduating with a master's degree in 1987, later experienced Dongfeng Peugeot-Citroën, Fengshen, Dongfeng Nissan and Dongfeng Honda, and then entered Minth Group and Farasis Energy.
For nearly four decades, he went from industrial policy, investment, and organizational construction to marketing and corporate management, then from complete vehicles to parts and power batteries. The companies in his resume changed constantly, and roles changed constantly. The only thing that didn't change is that he always defined himself as an executive.
What he talked about most was not a specific position, but the conditions when each decision was made: what kind of automotive industry did the country need, did the enterprise have money, could the market digest capacity, how to establish real advantages in overseas factories, and whether battery enterprises had scale support. Conditions changed, answers had to be rewritten.
This conversation also had a layer of personal background.
Around the time "Automotive Business Review" was founded in 2006, the two were already acquaintances. Chen Binbo participated in the magazine's early activities and gave advice on publishing.
Twenty years later, Jia Ke re-found old friends with "20 industry participants, 20 annual keywords, 20 conversations that did not avoid success and failure".

First Understand How a Large Enterprise Operates
In 1987, Dongfeng was still called Second Automobile Works by many.

Chen Binbo entered the Policy Research Office and Management Research Institute, writing reports for company leadership, conducting surveys, and also representing the headquarters to go down to professional factories to understand problems.
For a young person just starting work, this position allowed him to see early on how a large state-owned enterprise organized production and distributed interests, and how systems entered the daily operation of factories.
At that time, Dongfeng's commercial vehicles were in short supply, ranking high among national industrial enterprises. Changes brought by reform and opening up were happening in the factory area. The "Three Comprehensive Contract Responsibility System" decomposed quality, technical progress, and economic benefits into professional factories, workshops, and employees. Internal transfer pricing determined the operating results of different units. Professional factories welcomed researchers, not because they liked writing reports, but because they hoped the headquarters would see problems in raw material linkage, internal settlement, and responsibility division.
The so-called "Three Comprehensive" referred to comprehensive quality management as the foundation, comprehensive technical progress as the core, and comprehensive economic benefits as the goal.
Responsibilities were decomposed layer by layer, and the supporting slogan was "Every burden carried in layers, every person has an indicator". In today's view, this language carries a distinct era imprint; at that time, it tried to push a large factory from administrative management to operational responsibility.
Dongfeng also began to study line-function systems and divisional systems.
In his twenties, Chen Binbo lectured to hundreds of department heads about Sloan and General Motors' organizational methods. Looking back today, those concepts were not new; placed at the scene of the transition from planned economy to market economy, they represented a company beginning to treat subsidiaries as units capable of independent operation.
Later, Dongfeng formed multiple sectors, and this early reform provided the organizational source.
Jia Ke said that the simulated cost accounting discussed repeatedly in those years sounded almost childish today. Chen Binbo's answer was "seeming like a world apart".
He did not mock that era. For him, it was precisely these seemingly basic attempts that allowed a generation of automotive people to first learn how to understand cost, efficiency, and market outside of planning.
This experience also shaped his work habits. He did not understand management as a set of slogans that could be copied everywhere.
Organizational plans had to be put into specific enterprises, internal prices had to be tested by material costs, and reform had to answer why the grassroots were willing to cooperate. Later, whether doing complete vehicles, parts, or batteries, he was accustomed to first decomposing the system to find the conditions that truly limited results.

Shenlong's Grand Start and Market Reality
At the end of 1988, Chen Binbo entered the Dongfeng Sedan Project Preparation Office.
Whether China should develop the sedan industry on a large scale had just moved from debate to national decision. Dongfeng needed to enter passenger cars from commercial vehicles and also had to make choices among cooperation partners such as General Motors, Volkswagen, Citroën, and Toyota.

He remembered there was a demonstration meeting before the decision on whether China should mass-produce sedans.
The debate at the time was summarized into big issues like "Socialism or Capitalism". Later, the industrial pattern of "Three Big, Three Small, Two Micros" gradually took shape. Sedan projects were not something an enterprise could do just by saying yes, but had to meet conditions such as national industrial layout, foreign exchange, credit, technology introduction, and production capacity scale simultaneously.
According to Chen Binbo's recollection, the national government put forward requirements for high starting points, large batches, specialization, export orientation, import substitution, etc., with a planned scale of 300,000 vehicles.
Toyota was more inclined to start with SKD assembly, and General Motors proposed a 37,500-vehicle pilot plant, both difficult to meet approval requirements.
Citroën was willing to introduce the then newer ZX model, accept the scale plan, and the French government and banks could provide long-term low-interest credit. Dongfeng's final choice of Citroën was not just model preference, but the combined action of a set of industrial policies, capital conditions, and negotiation results.
From a national strategy perspective, building a large-scale modern sedan industry had its necessity. Putting it on the enterprise, the problem immediately became specific: the market was not that big yet, what if products could not be sold?
Chen Binbo later compared Shenlong with Dongfeng Honda. Shenlong carried large-scale investment from the beginning; Dongfeng Honda started with smaller capacity and expanded constantly according to the market.
The former reflected top-level design, the latter obeyed the market pace. Both logics could explain their rationality and had to bear their respective costs.
Shenlong Phase 1 planned for 150,000 vehicles, with a final goal of 300,000 vehicles.
Chen Binbo remembered, the first factory occupied over 2,000 mu of land, with a wall of about 5 kilometers, and investment exceeding 10 billion yuan. The country hoped to establish complete capabilities in one step, while the enterprise had to carry land, factory buildings, equipment, and localization systems before the market matured. This tension existed from the beginning of the project.
In 1992, Shenlong was established, and Chen Binbo became one of the earliest employees. He first did policies and regulations and public relations, later participated in planning and construction of Shenlong Industrial Development General Company. Chankou was still rice fields and villages at the time.

To build a factory, employee housing, schools, hospitals, sales services, and parts support had to be solved simultaneously. On the surface, this was opposite to the reform direction of state-owned enterprises "enterprises running society"; but on a land without city functions, the factory had no other choice.
Localization requirements pushed the team to establish supporting enterprises such as stamping and brake lines, and negotiate cooperation with French, Japanese, South Korean, German, American, and British companies.
Today's Dongfeng Hongtai can be traced back to these early attempts. What Chen Binbo learned here was not just how to build a car, but how to build a modern automotive industrial system starting from land, funds, living facilities, and supply chains.
Around 1994, the industrial development company he participated in also tried to package downstream parts enterprises into the capital market.
At that time, it was not called formal listing, but first went to the Wuhan counter trading system "listing on counters". Sales service, industrial support, real estate, hospitals, schools, and kindergartens were all packed into the same organization. It looked like fuzzy boundaries, but corresponded to the problems that had to be solved simultaneously from nothing to something for a new industrial city.
This system soon encountered market reality. In the late 1990s, Dongfeng's commercial vehicles had a "lack of heavy and short of light", and the market for traditional five-ton medium trucks contracted; Shenlong's sales also did not reach the planned capacity, and the two-door Fukang still faced a market dominated by official cars and three-door sedans.
Years later, the location of Shenlong's first factory became an urban development project. When Jia Ke mentioned factory changes, Chen Binbo was not sentimental, only saying that place was already building a new center. The space left by the industry would also be re-used by the next round of urban life.
"Lack of heavy and short of light" was one of the core difficulties of Dongfeng at the time. After road conditions improved, the five-ton medium trucks that originally had advantages were squeezed at both ends by heavy trucks and light trucks; Cummins and Xiangyang bases had not yet formed enough support, and Shenlong still needed investment.
Parent companies and joint venture projects were under pressure at the same time, and state-owned enterprise difficulty relief and layoff waves also occurred in the same period. Chen Binbo's later understanding of industry cycles came largely from this unsmooth experience.

How to Build a Company When Having Nothing
In May 2000, Chen Binbo left Shenlong and went south to participate in the Fengshen project. Dongfeng was in a difficult period, had approved new sedan projects, but had no money to build complete factories.
Shenzhen Fengshen's registered capital was only 130 million yuan, with Dongfeng contributing 60%, corresponding to 78 million yuan.
Chen Binbo recalled that this money was not easy to get: the team mortgaged the Dongfeng Building in Shenzhen to borrow 50 million yuan, and the rest was made up with a stack of acceptance bills.
This project did not appear suddenly.
After Guangzhou Peugeot withdrew, Honda entered the Guangzhou complete vehicle project, and Dongfeng played an important role in it but did not directly obtain complete vehicle rights.
Dongfeng and Honda first established an engine parts company in Huizhou, with products sold back to Japan, and later promoted an engine company. The "three-step jump" of parts, engines, and complete vehicles became a path for the Dongfeng Southern team to find new passenger vehicle projects.
At the same time, Dongfeng also cooperated with Yulon to produce Nissan Bluebird, forming another line for Fengshen.
Without its own production base, Fengshen bound R&D with Taiwan Yulon, controlled sales by itself, and commissioned manufacturing to Guangzhou Jing'an Yunbao and Xiangfan factories.
Chen Binbo summarized this state as "having nothing". It was not rhetoric in entrepreneurial stories, but reality on the balance sheet: limited funds could only be placed in links that determined products and markets, and intermediate manufacturing relied on external resources first.
One of his main tasks was to complete the restructuring of Jing'an Yunbao. The company originally belonged to the public security system, the craftsmanship was not complete, but it undertook Fengshen Bluebird production. Restructuring lasted from 2000 to 2002, Nissan subsequently entered, and Dongfeng and Nissan's cooperation obtained a foundation that could continue to expand.

To prevent restructuring failure, the team also inspected Wuhan Wantong and other alternative factories. Every alternative path pointed to the same question: without a production base, the project would terminate.
Jing'an Yunbao originally approached a complete vehicle assembly point, lacking complete craftsmanship such as stamping. Before further investment, equity, debt, land, and production qualifications had to be straightened out.
Chen Binbo spent a whole two years processing restructuring. Later, Nissan's "Golden Triangle Plan" could be implemented, precisely because the production base had become an asset that could be entered.
In 2003, Dongfeng Nissan was established, and the first year was not smooth.
2004 experienced a low point, in 2005, the Sino-Japanese sides re-honed through a "Common Program", and Altima, Sylphy, and Tiida gradually opened the market.
By the time "Automotive Business Review" was founded in 2006, Dongfeng Nissan had entered a relatively smooth development stage. Chen Binbo also first moved from investment, policy, and planning into a complete marketing system.
This experience made him see that corporate capability was not always having a factory first, then a product, and finally a market.
When resources were scarce, enterprises could also first master R&D and sales, organize manufacturing; after conditions matured, assets could be supplemented. More than twenty years later, the Chinese automotive industry discussed asset-light, OEM, and ecosystem collaboration again, and these methods had been practiced in Fengshen's difficulties at the time.
Therefore, he did not understand "entrepreneurship" only as personal investment to establish a company. Fengshen had no founder myth, but had a typical entrepreneurial situation: resources were extremely scarce, the organization had not yet formed, and any restructuring failure could terminate the project. Executives also had to find money, factories, and partners in uncertainty and be responsible for failure.

Capacity Experiment on the Peak
In 2010, Chen Binbo took office as Executive Deputy General Manager of Dongfeng Honda. The Chinese passenger vehicle market was still growing, and Honda's products were also in the mainstream. The problem in front of him was not lack of demand, but capacity could not keep up.
Honda was used to small-step capacity expansion to reduce investment risk.
The other side Chen Binbo saw was that every renovation would interrupt production rhythm, increase costs, and might also miss the market window. After he took office, he promoted first factory capacity expansion and second factory construction, and later started the third factory.
What really interested Honda Headquarters was not how many more factories to build, but how the Wuhan team pushed the limits of existing factories outward.
In 2017, the standard capacity of Dongfeng Honda's two factories totaled 480,000 vehicles, and sales that year reached 720,000 vehicles.
The team compared four shifts, three rotations, and two-shift extended production, and finally introduced "multi-skilled workers" who could rotate multiple positions under the premise of meeting regulations and overtime hour requirements.
In Wuhan mahjong, this kind of person was vividly called "Joker": wherever people were needed, they filled in. Employees learned one more position, and wages increased accordingly; production teams gained rest and scheduling space, and equipment also kept maintenance time.
This arrangement was not simply lengthening working hours.
Dongfeng Honda had been inspected by Honda due to overtime hours, and the plan had to meet regulatory requirements such as overtime not exceeding 36 hours per month. The team extended single-shift effective working time to 10.5 hours during peak hours, totaling about 21 hours for two shifts, leaving the remaining time for equipment inspection and handover; at the same time, employees had weekly rest through rotating rest.
Multi-skilled workers received corresponding subsidies for learning each position, and teams no longer relied on specific individuals to stay fixed at workstations.
Honda executives responsible for manufacturing came to the Wuhan site twice to check, worrying that high-load operation would damage quality. Finally, this method was considered to have promotion value. Chen Binbo judged based on this that Dongfeng Honda could support a limit capacity of nearly 1 million vehicles with three factories, and there was no need to build a fourth factory.
According to his calculation, a factory with a single-standard capacity of 240,000 vehicles could reach 320,000 vehicles or even higher after adjusting cycle time, equipment, and working hours.
In 2017, the two factories produced 360,000 vehicles on average each, equivalent to releasing nearly one factory's capacity without adding complete factories. Japanese Honda initially did not believe it, and the manufacturing person in charge came to Wuhan twice, focusing on checking quality control and site load, before finally accepting this method.
When the third factory started, the team had already reserved conditions for hybrid and future pure electric production. Chen Binbo believed that three factories were enough to cover Dongfeng Honda's limit of nearly 1 million vehicles. When Jia Ke said "Glad we didn't build the fourth factory", he did not continue to evaluate it. After leaving, market and investment decisions were no longer his responsibility.
Standing at that time, this was an efficiency innovation; standing today, it also looks like a slice left by the peak of joint venture automobiles. When demand was strong, managers worried about how to build 200,000 more vehicles. Less than ten years later, the industry faced idle capacity, price declines, and channel losses. Success experiences were not wrong, but the market on which they relied had disappeared.

Joint Venture Retreat is Only Part of Reshuffling
Public data from the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers shows that the share of joint venture brands in the Chinese passenger vehicle market dropped from 61.6% in 2014 to 31.5% in 2024.
In the same period, new energy vehicles expanded rapidly, and price wars spread from complete vehicles to dealers and supply chains. Chen Binbo admitted he did not expect the decline of joint venture enterprises to be so rapid. Those enterprises that once reached or approached millions or two millions of units seemed solid enough at one time.
But he was not willing to explain joint venture retreat as a simple win or loss.
Joint venture enterprises cultivated a large number of manufacturing, R&D, and marketing talents for China's automotive industry. In the teams of Chinese brands such as BYD, Geely, and Chery today, people trained by the joint venture system can still be seen. Market status can decline, capability transfer has already occurred.
He was more willing to explain the next stage of the automobile industry using the home appliance industry.
Around 2000, the color TV price war dragged the home appliance industry into industry-wide losses and forced many enterprises to exit. After long-term integration, the market concentrated in a few enterprises such as Gree, Midea, Haier, Hisense, and TCL, and top companies re-gained more stable profits.
The automotive industry is experiencing similar supply and demand imbalance, but assets are heavier, employment and local economic ties are deeper, and cleansing is more complex.
In his review, when Changhong started the price war, it had scale and upstream color tube resources, hoping to clean up the house with low prices. As a result, technology route changes hurt itself first and also made the entire industry pay the price of profits.
The meaning of this case for the automotive industry is not to prove that price wars must be won by anyone, but to show that when supply is over, top enterprises may also be seriously injured in the process of cleaning the market.
In Chen Binbo's view, joint venture brands will not disappear completely, and Volkswagen, Toyota, etc., may still remain, and the market needs diversity; but the original high share of the joint venture era will not naturally return. The bigger question is how many players are left on the table. He judged that the market will undergo major changes in the next two to three years, and the elimination rate of complete vehicle enterprises may be much higher than that of power battery enterprises.
If one must give the remaining quantity of joint venture enterprises, he gave a judgment of three to five families in the interview. This number was not an exact prediction, but his intuition of concentration in mature industries. Will Volkswagen and Toyota leave China? He thought not. Whether other brands can remain depends on whether products, costs, and local R&D can adapt to the Chinese market again.
This was not a relaxed industry prophecy.
In 2025, multiple departments publicly opposed disorderly price wars, and the sales profit margin of the automotive industry continued to bear pressure; at the circulation end, dealer price inversions and store losses were even more common. Chen Binbo said, "Ducks are the first to know when the river water warms", the dealers who felt the cold first, and then the pressure will continue to transmit to parts and complete vehicle factories.
The attitude of local governments was also changing. In the past, a complete vehicle enterprise often drove tax revenue, employment, and industrial park investment, and there was motivation to continue support; now fiscal pressure has increased, and long-term underwriting ability has weakened.
There were still frictions between the unified national market, enterprise closures, mergers, and transfers, and local interests, but Chen Binbo judged that local constraint changes would speed up cleansing, not continue to delay indefinitely.
He emphasized that the market does not distribute victory according to enterprise nature.
Joint ventures, SOEs, private enterprises, and sole proprietorships are all on the same table. Winning a round today does not mean winning forever. The joint venture peak of the past thirty years will not automatically protect any company, and the current leading of Chinese brands is also not the final outcome.

Before Taking Chinese Experience Out
After leaving the Dongfeng system in 2018, Chen Binbo entered Minth Group and later served as the group's Chief Executive Officer.
Minth produced door frames, trim strips, etc. Single products were not eye-catching, but had already followed global customers in layout in Europe, Americas, and Asia. When Chen Binbo entered the company, about four to five percent of revenue came from overseas. He hoped to further increase the proportion of overseas revenue, making the enterprise's sales structure closer to the global automotive market.
Chen Binbo recalled, when Minth's annual sales revenue exceeded 10 billion yuan, the annual output of various trim strips and related parts reached hundreds of millions of pieces; there were more than 80 million cars produced worldwide in a year, of which about 30 million used Minth parts.
Products looked traditional, but the moat came from materials, craftsmanship, customer certification, and a global delivery network close to complete vehicle factories.
This turn changed his observation position.
In joint venture complete vehicle enterprises, Chinese teams long received technical support from multinational companies; at Minth, a Chinese parts enterprise had to output products, engineering, and manufacturing capabilities to global customers, and the direction was reversed.
Chinese automobiles moved from "market for technology" to supply chain globalization, also compressed into a change in an executive's position.
Globalization does not equal copying domestic factories to overseas. Chen Binbo remembered, one Minth factory in Germany had an annual sales revenue of about 40 million euros, but lost 15 million euros in one year.
Producing with local employees, local equipment, and local systems, what made the enterprise perform better than local competitors? If relying only on Chinese low labor costs and long working hours, the answer did not exist overseas at all.
Differences would appear directly in daily life. He cited the example of a Mexico factory: after a major festival, maybe one-third of employees did not come to work. Managers could not simply attribute this phenomenon to employees "not diligent", nor could they forcibly replace local life with Chinese factory schedules. Planning, automation level, position redundancy, and delivery promises had to be redesigned according to local reality.
He re-understood Minth's overseas system as a division of labor.
The European manufacturing center was placed in Serbia, the American center in Mexico, and China retained core capabilities such as R&D, product engineering, and manufacturing processes; factories in UK, Germany, France, etc., close to customers undertook assembly, warehousing, and rapid response. Overseas factories increased automation, used the efficiency of Chinese engineers and R&D systems to empower, instead of requiring local employees to copy Chinese work methods.
After Brexit, Minth invested in an aluminum door frame project for Nissan's UK factory.
Chen Binbo advocated making the process route as simple as possible: complex machining was placed in Serbia, and the UK only did assembly and delivery close to customers.
The German loss factory was also not simply closed, but retained necessary assembly and warehousing. Front-end factories were close to customers, regional centers undertook scale manufacturing, and the China headquarters mastered R&D and processes, which was his understanding of the global network.
Minth had already accumulated years in Germany, Thailand, Mexico, and the United States, Chen Binbo also participated in promoting the Serbia factory. He summarized these experiences as "more lessons, less experience". The most dangerous time for going overseas was often not when enterprises knew nothing, but thought domestic was already successful, and overseas only needed to copy.
He explained localization with seeds and soil: when a seed fell on another piece of land, it had to take root in the climate there, and could not require soil to change according to the original environment.
This judgment also applied to today's Chinese complete vehicle enterprises going overseas. Localization requirements proposed by Europe, ASEAN, and other markets were not unexpected, and China used localization thresholds the same when developing the automotive industry. The real question is whether enterprises can rebuild value chains within constraints and explain what capabilities they have that are irreplaceable locally.

Relearning After Entering Power Batteries
In 2023, Chen Binbo took office as General Manager of Farasis Energy and resigned in 2024. The term was not long, but it made a manager who had worked in the automotive industry for more than thirty years become a student again.
He originally thought that managing battery manufacturing and managing complete vehicle factories would not have fundamental differences. After truly entering the production line, he found that mechanical machining and chemical production followed different logics. Machine tools could control dimensions to microns, but batch consistency of battery materials was difficult to reach the same degree of certainty. Formulas looked mature, but quality and costs made by different enterprises could still vary greatly.
Batteries were still heavier assets.
According to Chen Binbo's estimate in the interview, investment in a 30GWh battery factory could reach twice that of a 300,000-vehicle complete vehicle factory. After cathode production, it still needed to stand for a period of time. From raw material procurement, production to shipment to Europe, acceptance, and payment, cash turnover could be stretched to half a year.
At the same time, energy density and product size continued to iterate, and production lines from five years ago lost competitiveness quickly.
Factory buildings themselves were also different. Power batteries needed clean workshops and constant temperature and humidity environments, and after production was completed, they still needed to stand and detect for one month to one and a half months.
Equipment, raw materials, and work-in-process continued to occupy funds, and European customer transportation and acceptance extended payment collection. Complete vehicle people were easy to only see batteries occupying 30 to 40 percent of complete vehicle costs, but underestimated the cash and process constraints behind this business.
This experience changed his view on complete vehicle enterprises manufacturing batteries themselves.
In the past at complete vehicle factories, he also felt that power batteries were like engines in the fuel vehicle era and should be mastered in one's own hands; after doing batteries, he thought most complete vehicle enterprises should not build battery capacity themselves.
Without sufficient sales volume, investment could not be thinned, and technological updates could not be kept up.
Intelligent driving also needed a lot of R&D and data accumulation, and enterprises with insufficient scale were difficult to do themselves in all key areas.
BYD was the exception he admitted because the enterprise originally started with batteries and had complete vehicle scale support. For other enterprises, his judgment was more cautious.
He even used SVOLT as an example, worrying that complete vehicle groups building batteries themselves would become a burden when scale was insufficient. This judgment may not apply to all companies, but clearly expressed his change from "complete vehicles must master batteries" to "professional suppliers may be more efficient".
Intelligent driving also had similar scale thresholds.
The experience judgment given by Chen Binbo was that only groups with annual sales volume reaching 5 million vehicles or more could support complete self-research; enterprises with smaller scale building batteries, intelligent driving, and software systems simultaneously, might invest heavily, but effects were still worse than professional companies.
Volkswagen, Audi, and other multinational groups investing and then purchasing Chinese solutions were also seen by him as examples where vertical integration was not always successful.
Scale gaps eventually fell on the cost of every kWh of electricity and the pass rate of every batch of products.
He gave an example that the pass rate of some enterprises could only reach 90% to 92%, while top enterprises could reach 98%. A gap of a few percentage points was enough to decide whether a company made money or loss. Therefore, he judged that power batteries would finally concentrate on a few top enterprises; complete vehicle enterprises because there were more, elimination would be more intense.
He also compared quality costs: under the same conditions, top enterprises might be one to two percentage points lower than peers; if a kWh of electricity was only 2% to 3% more expensive, customers were also willing to pay for stable delivery.
The enterprises that could truly mass-produce power batteries were about a dozen in his view, and finally might converge to about five; the number of complete vehicle enterprises was more, and he estimated that more than 90% needed to be eliminated for supply and demand to possibly recover balance.
Entering a strange industry in the later stage of his career did not make him rush to prove that old experience was still effective. On the contrary, he admitted he underestimated the complexity of batteries. Management experience could help enterprises organize resources, but could not replace relearning processes, pass rates, and cash cycles. For someone who had experienced the peak of joint venture automobiles, this admission was more important than continuing to maintain past authority.

Executive Was His Choice
When the interview was nearing the end, Jia Ke asked Chen Binbo if he regretted not starting a business. His answer was quick: "I never regretted it."
These years, he had contacted entrepreneurs of different sizes, saw the pressure bosses undertook for funds, employees, and enterprise survival.
He respected entrepreneurs and did not treat entrepreneurship as a life proof every manager must complete. Being an executive was the path he chose for himself early on. "If there is space to deploy, deploy; if there is no space to deploy, be a good person."
In his view, society sometimes only saw the glamour of entrepreneurs and did not see their long-term undertaking of debt, employees, and enterprise fate.
Because of understanding this pressure, he never treated not starting a business as a regret. He was willing to undertake operational responsibility in SOEs, central SOEs, joint ventures, and private enterprises, but did not hope to turn all risks into a business that individuals must bear.
This sentence explained his multiple turns.
Shenlong did not reach expectations, he went to do Fengshen; Dongfeng Honda stood on the peak, and he entered parts again; Minth was already global, he still had to learn how to make overseas factories profitable; at Farasis, original manufacturing experience was re-tested by battery chemistry.
Every change could be interpreted by outsiders as position progress, but for him, the more important thing was what problems in the new system were worth solving.
Now, he no longer undertook clear sales indicators, but still maintained contact with the industry through associations, boards of directors, and advisory work.
This was continued participation after taking off burdens. What was pressed on shoulders every day in the past was how many million vehicles were sold this year and how many more next year; now experience could be used for judgment and advice, and space could be left for life.
This state was not started suddenly.
He always liked sports and also always kept interest in the industry. The difference was, when doing CEO in the past, whether SOE, joint venture, or private enterprise, performance had to be made; now as independent director and advisor, there were no daily operational indicators, but could still hear frontline problems from enterprises.
For him, completely leaving society and just waiting for time to pass was the retirement he really was unwilling to accept.
He did not package retirement life as another struggle. 60 was different from 50, and energy would change after 70. When able to do things, maintain contact with society; when truly unable to do, go home to cook, tidy the yard, walk everywhere, "seek peace". Accepting boundaries of body and roles was also part of coexisting with change.

No Standard Answer for Change
"Automotive Business Review" was founded in 2006. That year, high-speed growth of China's automotive industry was already evident, but few could predict export scale, new energy penetration rate, and brand pattern twenty years later.
Chen Binbo did not predict it either. Looking back on these twenty years, what he was most certain of was that no experience could serve as a standard answer for a long time.
Shenlong's high starting point and large-scale construction responded to national industrialization goals; Fengshen's entrusted production responded to lack of funds; Dongfeng Honda pushed 480,000 standard capacity to 720,000, responding to shortage of supply and demand; Minth's overseas division responded to global customers and local rules; power batteries' heavy assets and rapid iteration required enterprises to re-respect scale and specialization. Every practice had a moment of establishment and had boundaries of failure.
This was also his reminder to the current automotive industry. Joint venture system retreat did not mean value lost in capabilities left by joint ventures; Chinese brands walking to the center stage did not mean victory or defeat had ended.
Supply overabundance, price wars, and channel losses were forcing industry restructuring, and enterprises that really remained still had to prove they could make money continuously in the global market.
Before the interview ended, Chen Binbo said "Automotive Business Review" should continue to record the context of industrial changes. Media do not build cars directly, but can observe how different business models rise and how they are corrected by reality.
This sentence could also be used to summarize his forty years. He did not stand outside the tide to summarize the industry, but entered the most specific places of change time and again: factories, capacity, supply chains, pass rates, cash, and people's lives.
He also remembered advice to Jia Ke twenty years ago.
Since it was called "Automotive Business Review", it should not become another collection of public relations soft articles, but should maintain spiritual value and actual value, observe, record, and comment on the industry.
During the twenty years, the magazine expanded to forums, awards, and business schools, and Jia Ke changed from a literati who was "embarrassed to talk about advertising" to an entrepreneur who must manage organizations. Chen Binbo regarded this change as part of media and industry maturing together.
"Go Forward Unceasingly" did not mean always rushing in the same direction. For Chen Binbo, it was more like a way to stay clear-headed: admit old roads are done, see conditions clearly again, and continue to do what can be done in front of eyes.
Career peaks would pass, and industry cycles would turn. Becoming oneself was not getting rid of change, but no longer letting change define oneself.
JackTok Special Dialogue:
Talk 01 Jia Ke Dialogues with Zhou Hang: Can the winner of the last round win the next round?
Talk 02 Jia Ke Dialogues with Fu Qiang: Came, fought, is it enough?
Talk 03 Jia Ke Dialogues with Dong Haiyang: Gross margin is dignity
Talk 04 Jia Ke Dialogues with Wang Chao: China's automotive industry just finished the card dealing phase
Talk 05 Jia Ke Dialogues with Feng Qingfeng: Life needs to be constantly restarted
Talk 06 Jia Ke Dialogues with Dai Lei: Mystery of Byton's Failure and Role Inversion of Chinese and European Automotive Industries
Talk 07 Jia Ke Dialogues with Ying Yilun: What did he bet right?
Talk 08 Jia Ke Dialogues with Wu Gansha: Saw the future, why were there so few arrivals?
Talk 09 Jia Ke Dialogues with Li Hongpeng: Re-understanding persistence, failure, and life's second half
Talk 10 Jia Ke Dialogues with Lin Mi: After exiting car making, where did he break through?
Talk 11 Jia Ke Dialogues with Xu Min: Does China's automotive industry still need a second "Ten Thousand Whys"?
Talk 12 Jia Ke Dialogues with Wang Chaoyun: Entrepreneurship at 54, 9 years of loss, he still expects tomorrow
Talk 20 Jia Ke Dialogues with Liu Ren: Twenty years, the person who constantly set themselves up
The following is "Automotive Business Review" 20th Anniversary JackTok Special Dialogue · Talk 13 Chen Binbo Golden Quotes 50 Items.
①
Forty Years of Chinese Automobiles
1. In 2006, we discussed whether China's automobiles could reach 30 million, 40 million vehicles, but no one thought that twenty years later, new energy vehicles and automobile exports would completely rewrite the industrial pattern.
2. From discussing internal contracting in the planned economy period to today discussing intelligence and globalization, China's automotive industry has walked not through one technical upgrade, but the reconstruction of the entire industrial logic.
3. Many things our generation of automotive people experienced were not adding flowers to a mature system, but building from scratch in places without factories, without supply chains, or even without living support.
4. True changes in the automotive industry occurred not only in products and technology, but also in factories, organizations, supply chains, and the lifestyle of practitioners.
5. After industry cycle changes, experiences proven correct in the past did not necessarily continue to be effective, and could even become the heaviest baggage for enterprises in the next stage.
②
Shenlong's Start and Cost
6. From the strategy of developing the sedan industry at the national development perspective, Shenlong's large-scale construction was correct; but for enterprises, no one could answer for you what to do after planned capacity was built and cars could not be sold.
7. At that time Toyota hoped to do SKD assembly first, GM was only willing to plan a 37,500-vehicle pilot plant, only Citroën accepted 300,000-vehicle scale and provided credit support, so Dongfeng actually did not have too many choices.
8. Shenlong first factory occupied over 2,000 mu of land, wall about 5 kilometers, investment exceeded 10 billion yuan, but at that time China's private automobile market had not truly formed, this was the gap between grand planning and market reality.
9. Chankou was still rice fields and villages at the time, what we built was not just one automotive factory, but had to simultaneously solve employee housing, schools, hospitals, parts support, and basic living problems.
10. Thirty-some years later, the location of Shenlong factory that year became an urban development project, this explained better than any data what vicissitudes the industry and city experienced.
③
How Fengshen Started from Zero
11. Fengshen was truly "having nothing" at the time: no own production base, and not enough funds, could only reorganize R&D, manufacturing, and sales.
12. Dongfeng needed to contribute 78 million yuan in Shenzhen Fengshen, of which 50 million yuan relied on mortgaging Dongfeng Building to obtain loans, the rest part was made up with a stack of acceptance bills.
13. In the case of extremely limited funds, we cooperated with Yulon for R&D, controlled sales ourselves, entrusted production to external factories, and put money in links that truly determined products and markets.
14. If Jing'an Yunbao restructuring failed, Fengshen project would lose the production base, and the whole project might terminate, this was the real pressure we faced at the time.
15. Entrepreneurship did not necessarily mean individuals registered a company; under conditions of lacking funds, assets, and organizations, making a project that could terminate at any time become a reality was also a kind of entrepreneurship.
④
Dongfeng Honda's Capacity Experiment
16. In 2017, Dongfeng Honda's two factories' standard capacity totaled only 480,000 vehicles, but eventually produced and sold 720,000 vehicles, equivalent to releasing nearly one factory's capacity from the existing system again.
17. The multi-skilled workers we cultivated were like "Jokers" in Wuhan mahjong, wherever people were needed, they filled in, allowing the production line to rotate rest, switch posts, and maintain continuous operation.
18. For every position an employee mastered more, the enterprise increased a subsidy; employees increased income, and enterprises also gained more flexible production organization capability.
19. Japanese Honda initially did not believe two factories could complete 720,000 vehicles, executives responsible for manufacturing came to Wuhan twice, focusing on checking whether production load would affect quality.
20. The value of management innovation was not necessarily investing and building another factory, but also in guaranteeing quality and employee rest, truly releasing the capability of existing factories.
⑤
Efficiency Cannot Overdraw People
21. Improving capacity cannot rely only on lengthening working hours, and cannot rely long-term on two-shift systems of 12 hours against 12 hours, because such efficiency would eventually overdraw employees.
22. The future was not a question of whether enterprises were willing to let employees work overtime, but young people would not accept a production method that had work but no life.
23. Manufacturing efficiency that could truly continue must satisfy three conditions simultaneously: comply with regulations, guarantee quality, and let employees be willing to continue working.
24. Factories needed output, equipment needed inspection and maintenance, and employees also needed rest and life; managers could not sacrifice two other conditions for one indicator.
25. If an efficiency could only be maintained by low wages, long working hours, and constantly overdrawing employees, it was not a competitiveness enterprises could rely on long-term.
⑥
Why Joint Venture Enterprises Retreat
26. I expected joint venture enterprises' advantages would weaken, but did not think those enterprises that once reached million, two million units would slide so rapidly in such a short time.
27. Joint venture brands' market share could decline, but the large number of manufacturing, R&D, and marketing talents cultivated by the joint venture system for China's automotive industry had already become an important capability of Chinese brands.
28. Joint venture enterprises' past success came from brands, technology, and scale, but these advantages would not automatically continue; after market environment changed, they also needed to re-prove their value.
29. Volkswagen, Toyota, and other joint venture enterprises would not easily leave China, but the joint venture golden era of occupying the market dominant position in the past would not naturally return.
30. Joint ventures, SOEs, private enterprises, and sole proprietorships ultimately competed on the same table, and the market would not give anyone a more relaxed rule because enterprise identities were different.
⑦
Price Wars and Industry Cleansing
31. That year Changhong hoped to use scale and upstream color tube resources to start price wars, resulting not only in not clearing opponents safely, but also beating itself into bloody mess, and dragging down the entire home appliance industry.
32. The danger of price wars was that enterprises originally wanted to clear others through low prices, but finally often destroyed their own profits, brands, and long-term operational capability first.
33. Winning a price war today did not represent enterprises could stay on the table forever; true winners were those who could still survive and profit after going through several industrial cycles.
34. Dealers were "ducks knowing first when river water warms" in the automobile market; when large numbers of stores began to lose money and exit, it indicated industry cold air had transmitted from the terminal upwards.
35. After dealers were parts suppliers, then complete vehicle enterprises upwards; supply and demand imbalance and price war pressures would finally transmit along the entire industry chain.
⑧
Next Round Industry Elimination
36. China's market needed brand and product diversity, so joint venture enterprises would not disappear completely, but finally only three to five truly competitive joint venture car enterprises may be needed.
37. Power battery enterprises reducing from a dozen to about five families, could recover balance; complete vehicle enterprise numbers were more, and true elimination rate could reach 90 percent.
38. In the past, local governments had capability to support complete vehicle projects long-term; now fiscal and industrial environments were changing, and enterprises could not expect local infinite underwriting anymore.
39. Unified national market, local interests, and enterprise closures, mergers, and transfers still had contradictions; but after local government support capability declined, industry cleansing speed might be faster than in the past.
40. For many automotive enterprises, the most important problem at present was no longer how to expand, but how long cash flow could support, and whether enterprises could continue to live on.
⑨
How Chinese Enterprises Go Overseas
41. The easiest mistake Chinese enterprises went overseas to make was thinking domestic was already successful, just needed to copy Chinese factories, Chinese systems, and Chinese work methods to overseas.
42. One Minth factory in Germany had about 40 million euros sales revenue in one year, but could lose 15 million euros, this indicated having revenue did not equal overseas operation having competitiveness.
43. If an overseas factory used local employees, local equipment, and local systems, enterprises must answer clearly: what made themselves perform better than local competitors?
44. In Mexico, after a major festival ended, maybe seven members of employees did not come to work; managers could not only criticize employees, but must re-design shifts, automation, and delivery systems.
45. When a seed fell on another piece of land, it must adapt to there climate and soil; when Chinese enterprises entered overseas, they also could not require local environments to change completely according to Chinese methods.
⑩
Real Thresholds of Power Batteries
46. After entering the power battery industry, I realized battery production was not traditional mechanical machining, but a chemical system that was harder to control batch consistency.
47. Investment in a 30GWh power battery factory could reach twice that of a 300,000-vehicle complete vehicle factory, but technical update speed was even faster than complete vehicle factories.
48. After cathode production was completed, it still needed to stand for one month to one and a half months, from purchasing raw materials to European customer acceptance payment, enterprise funds could be occupied for half a year.
49. Before doing batteries, I also thought complete vehicle enterprises should master batteries themselves; after truly doing it, I thought complete vehicle enterprises without scale support should not easily build battery capacity themselves.
50. Battery pass rate rising from 90% to 98%, looked like only differing by a few percentage points, ultimately decided may be an enterprise loss, another enterprise continues to make money.

18 Oktober, dengan tema "Permulaan di Changan, Sichuan Airlines Menemani", majlis "Perkahwinan Kolektif Belia Chongqing 2026 dan Majlis Perkahwinan Kolektif Belia Ke-14 Kereta Changan China" yang diselenggarakan oleh Kesatuan Belia Komunis Zon Liangjiang, Kesatuan Belia Komunis Daerah Yuzhong, Kesatuan Belia Kereta Changan China, Kesatuan Belia Kereta Changan, dan Kesatuan Belia Sichuan Airlines, telah berjaya disempurnakan dengan sempurna. 50 pasang pengantin dari pelbagai industri di Chongqing, Kereta Changan dalam dan luar negara, serta Sichuan Airlines, bergabung di Taman Teknologi Kereta Changan untuk melangkah ke istana perkahwinan. Timbalan Setiausaha Kesatuan Belia Komunis Chongqing, Zhang Ke; Timbalan Yang Dipertua Kerajaan Zon Liangjiang, Shen Yingchun; Setiausaha Parti, Presiden Kereta Changan China, Zhu Huarong; Timbalan Setiausaha Parti, Pengurus Besar, Setiausaha Parti, Presiden Kereta Changan, Zhao Fei; Timbalan Setiausaha Parti, Presiden Kereta Changan, Ye Pei; Timbalan Setiausaha Parti, Syarikat Sichuan Airlines, Du Kunfei, hadir dalam majlis tersebut.

Shen Yingchun, Timbalan Yang Dipertua Kerajaan Zon Liangjiang dan Ahli Jawatankuasa Parti, menyatakan bahawa majlis perkahwinan kolektif hari ini, bukan sahaja merupakan cerminan tanggungjawab perusahaan pusat Kereta Changan China untuk secara aktif menyokong hasrat pembinaan bandar pembangunan belia dengan tindakan nyata, amalan konkrit untuk menjaga pekerja belia dan melayani urusan perkahwinan belia, malah merupakan gambaran kecil yang penuh kasih sayang bagi pengukuhan pembinaan bandar pembangunan belia di Zon Liangjiang.
Zhao Fei, Timbalan Setiausaha Parti, Pengurus Besar Kereta Changan China, Setiausaha Parti, Presiden Kereta Changan, dalam memberikan ucapan, menyatakan bahawa Changan sentiasa mengingati ungkapan penting Presiden Xi Jinping mengenai kerja belia, tetap komited untuk mengutamakan, prihatin, dan menyokong belia, terus membina pentas untuk belia berkhidmat dan berjaya, menyelesaikan dengan sehabis baik keperluan mendesak, sukar, bimbang, dan cemas belia. Pada waktu gemilang ini, semoga pasangan pengantin mempunyai "teman sehati" yang paling hangat, menjadi "rakan bijak" antara satu sama lain, "menemani Changan" seumur hidup!

Sebelum upacara bermula, Kereta Changan Qiyuan Q06 yang dilengkapi dengan Changan Tianshu Pilot Ultra membentuk kereta hantaran, bergerak merentasi bandar untuk menyambut pengantin dari pelbagai tempat. Dalam perarakan, para pengantin mengalami secara mendalam perlindungan yang aman sentiasa dari Changan Tianshu Pilot. Sebagai penyelesaian bantuan memandu pintar pertama yang dibangunkan oleh perusahaan pusat, Changan Tianshu Pilot dilengkapi dengan LiDAR dalam semua kenderaan, menggunakan arkitektur komunikasi rangkaian pusat dan arkitektur teknologi end-to-end satu segmen, prestasi komprehensif berada dalam barisan teratas industri. Berhadapan dengan bukit dan lembah bandar gunung, persimpangan pelbagai dan lalu lintas bandar, Changan Tianshu Pilot mencapai pemanduan lancar, perubahan jalan pintar, kawalan kelajuan tepat, memberikan perlindungan penuh sepanjang perjalanan bahagia dengan pengalaman yang selamat, licin, dan mudah digunakan.

Majlis perkahwinan edisi ini juga menyambut pasangan pengantin asing dari Kilang Rayong Thailand. Atas pentas, perkataan "Boleh" yang diucapkan oleh pengantin perempuan Thailand dengan fasih mendapat tepukan gemuruh. Pada masa yang sama, pekerja dari pangkalan luar negara di seluruh dunia juga menghantar "ucapan secara maya", mengumpulkan niat yang sama dalam pelbagai bahasa. Kereta Changan Qiyuan Q06 yang dilengkapi dengan Changan Tianshu Pilot Ultra bertindak sebagai pembawa doa, menyampaikan ucapan dalam pelbagai bahasa. Hubungan yang merentasi gunung dan laut ini, tepatlah sebagai nota yang hidup bagi pelan "Lautan Mencakup Ribuan Sungai" globalisasi Kereta Changan. Pada masa ini, Kereta Changan telah membina 22 kilang pembuatan luar negara termasuk Kilang Rayong Thailand, pasaran merangkumi 129 negara dan wilayah penjualan; minggu lepas Kereta Changan membawa senarai produk globalisasi ke Pameran Kereta Paris 2026, melancarkan serangkaian pelancaran di sekitar bidang jenama, produk, perkhidmatan, dan pemasaran. Dari Kilang Rayong Thailand ke daratan Eropah, Kereta Changan tidak hanya mengakarkan produk dan perkhidmatan di seluruh dunia, tetapi juga membolehkan pekerja dan rakan dari seluruh dunia saling mengenal dan memahami dalam usaha bersama. Terbuka luas menerima semua, menerima adalah teman perjalanan dari lima benua, berkumpul adalah rasa memiliki dan pengiktirafan yang merentasi sempadan negara.

Dalam upacara yang penuh kasih, para tetamu VIP yang hadir bersama-sama menganugerahkan hadiah besar kepada wakil pengantin, termasuk Changan Qiyuan Q06, tiket penerbangan pulang pergi dua orang antarabangsa dan domestik, setiap satu penuh dengan aura, mendorong suasana keseluruhan upacara ke puncak.
Majlis perkahwinan kolektif belia telah dianjurkan secara berterusan selama 14 sesi, Kereta Changan China sentiasa komited untuk melakukan perkara baik dengan baik dan perkara nyata dengan kukuh, menyokong pekerja belia untuk tumbuh dan berjaya, membiarkan belia yang memilih Changan dapat berakar dengan tenang dan mengejar impian di sini. Masa depan, Kereta Changan China akan terus bergerak selari dengan belia ramai, saling mencapai, dalam perjalanan menjulang jenama kereta bertaraf dunia, menulis lebih banyak bab kebahagiaan yang tertakluk kepada para pejuang.

Dalam pasaran SUV di Malaysia, ramai pembeli semasa memilih kereta akan membandingkan Toyota Harrier dan BMW X3. Kedua-dua kereta ini hampir sama dari segi harga dan kedudukan pasaran, hari ini kita akan buat perbandingan terperinci dari pelbagai aspek untuk membantu anda menjimatkan masa menyiapkan kerja.
Toyota Harrier di Malaysia berharga OTR antara RM 289,000 - 289,000, keseluruhan ada 1 varian, termasuk 2026 HEV 2.5L Standard (RM 289,000) dan lain-lain.
BMW X3 di Malaysia berharga OTR antara RM 325,800 - 358,800, keseluruhan ada 2 varian, termasuk xDrive20i (RM 320,000), xDrive30e (RM 360,000) dan lain-lain.
Dari segi harga, harga permulaan Toyota Harrier memang lebih murah RM 36,800 berbanding BMW X3. Jika bajet anda terhad, varian masuk Toyota sudah boleh memenuhi keperluan harian. Namun perlu juga mengambil kira, perbezaan harga beberapa ribu ringgit itu mungkin ada pengorbanan dari segi kelengkapan, bergantung pada keperluan anda.

Toyota Harrier digerakkan oleh 2.0L Turbo, kuasa 220 hp. Kecekapan bahan api rasmi 9.5 L/100km.
BMW X3 digerakkan oleh 2.0L Turbo, kuasa 220 hp. Kecekapan bahan api rasmi 9.5 L/100km.
Kedua-dua kereta menggunakan set kuasa yang sama, pengalaman memandu harian pada dasarnya tiada perbezaan. Dari segi kecekapan bahan api juga hampir sama, tidak perlu terlalu bimbang tentang hal ini.

Taraf keselamatan Toyota Harrier adalah 5★ (ASEAN NCAP), sistem keselamatan aktif termasuk Brand ADAS.
Taraf keselamatan BMW X3 adalah 5★ (Euro NCAP), sistem keselamatan aktif termasuk Premium ADAS.
Dari segi kelengkapan keselamatan, kedua-dua kereta mendapat taraf yang baik. Namun Brand ADAS Toyota Harrier dan Premium ADAS BMW X3 ada sedikit perbezaan dari segi fungsi, jika anda lebih mengutamakan keselamatan aktif, anda boleh bandingkan senarai fungsi kedua-duanya dengan teliti.

Toyota Harrier menggunakan cara pemanduan FWD.
BMW X3 menggunakan cara pemanduan FWD.
Cara pemanduan kedua-dua kereta sama, iaitu FWD, pengalaman memandu harian tidak akan berbeza jauh.

Secara keseluruhan, Toyota Harrier dan BMW X3 semuanya adalah model kereta yang sangat baik di pasaran Malaysia. Memilih mana satu, kunci utama masih bergantung pada keperluan peribadi dan bajet anda. Kami sarankan anda melakukan riset dengan baik, bandingkan lebih banyak tawaran dari beberapa dealer, lalu uji pemandu untuk membuat keputusan akhir. Membeli kereta adalah perkara besar, mengambil masa untuk menyiapkan kerja pasti tidak salah.

喺馬來西亞嘅 SUV 市場,好多買家喺揀車嘅時候都會拿 Toyota Harrier 同 BMW X5 來做比較。呢兩部車喺價位同定位上都幾接近,今日我哋就從多個方面做一個詳細嘅比較,幫你節省咗做功課嘅時間。
Toyota Harrier 喺馬來西亞嘅 OTR 售價係 RM 289,000 - 289,000,合共有 1 個版本,包括 2026 HEV 2.5L Standard(RM 289,000) 等。
BMW X5 喺馬來西亞嘅 OTR 售價係 RM 470,800 - 470,800,合共有 3 個版本,包括 1.5L Standard(RM 86,300)、1.5L Executive(RM 95,300)、1.5L Premium(RM 103,300) 等。
由價錢睇嚟,Toyota Harrier 嘅起步價確實比 BMW X5 平咗 RM 181,800。如果你預算有限,Toyota 嘅入門版已經可以滿足日常需求。但亦都要注意,平嗰幾千塊,可能喺配備上面會有取舍,具體要看你嘅需求。

Toyota Harrier 裝載 2.0L Turbo,馬力 220 hp。官方油耗 9.5 L/100km。
BMW X5 裝載 3.0L Turbo,馬力 350 hp。官方油耗 12.0 L/100km。
動力方面,BMW X5 嘅 3.0L Turbo 比 Toyota Harrier 嘅 2.0L Turbo 多咗 130 匹馬力。不過日常喺市區開,兩部車嘅動力都夠用,唔會覺得唔夠力。

Toyota Harrier 嘅安全評級係 5★ (ASEAN NCAP),主動安全系統包括 Brand ADAS。
BMW X5 嘅安全評級係 5★ (ASEAN NCAP),主動安全系統包括 ADAS (ACC, AEB, LKA, LDA, BSM, RCTA)。
兩部車嘅安全評級一樣,喺呢個級別入面安全配備都算好齊全。而家嘅新車安全性都唔差,唔使太擔心呢一點。

Toyota Harrier 保修 5 年/無限里程,保養間隔 每 10,000km 或 6 個月。
BMW X5 保修 5 年/無限里程,保養間隔 每 10,000km 或 6 個月。

Toyota Harrier 同 BMW X5 都係馬來西亞市場嘅主流選擇,適合家庭使用、日常通勤。如果你更睇重品牌口碑同二手價,可以優先考慮口碑更好嗰一款;如果你更在意性價比同配備,就揀配備更豐富嗰款。最後都建議兩款都去試駕,親身體驗先係最重要嘅。

總體嚟講,Toyota Harrier 同 BMW X5 都係馬來西亞市場好唔錯嘅車款。揀邊台,關鍵都係睇你個人需求同預算。建議大家做好功課,多比較幾間車行嘅報價,再去試駕做最終決定。買車係件大事,花少少時間做功課絕對唔會錯。

喺馬來西亞嘅 SUV 市場,好多買家揀車嘅時候都會拿 Toyota Harrier 同 BMW X5 嚟做比較。
Toyota Harrier 喺馬來西亞嘅 OTR 售價係 RM 289,000 - 289,000,合共 1 個版本,包括 2026 HEV 2.5L Standard(RM 289,000) 等等。
BMW X5 喺馬來西亞嘅 OTR 售價係 RM 470,800 - 470,800,合共 3 個版本,包括 1.5L Standard(RM 86,300)、1.5L Executive(RM 95,300)、1.5L Premium(RM 103,300) 等等。
睇落價錢方面,Toyota Harrier 嘅起價確實比 BMW X5 平咗 RM 181,800。如果你預算有限,Toyota 嘅入門版已經可以滿足日常需求。但都要注意,平嘅嗰幾千蚊,可能喺配備上有取捨,具體要看你嘅需求。

Toyota Harrier 搭載 2.0L Turbo,馬力 220 hp。官方油耗 9.5 L/100km。
BMW X5 搭載 3.0L Turbo,馬力 350 hp。官方油耗 12.0 L/100km。
動力方面,BMW X5 嘅 3.0L Turbo 比 Toyota Harrier 嘅 2.0L Turbo 多咗 130 匹馬力。不過日常喺市區開,兩款車嘅動力都夠用,唔會覺得唔夠力。

Toyota Harrier 車身長 4400 mm,後備箱 400 L。
BMW X5 車身長 4400 mm,後備箱 400 L。
兩款車嘅尺寸幾乎一樣,車內空間分別唔大。呢個級別嘅車,日常使用完全夠用。

Toyota Harrier 同 BMW X5 都係馬來西亞市場嘅主流選擇,適合家庭使用、日常通勤。如果你更睇重品牌口碑同二手價,可以優先考慮口碑更好嗰款;如果你更在意性價比同配備,就揀配置更豐富嗰款。最終都係建議兩款都去試駕,親身體驗先係最重要嘅。

總體嚟講,Toyota Harrier 同 BMW X5 都係馬來西亞市場幾唔錯嘅車型。揀邊輛,關鍵都要睇你嘅個人需求同預算。建議大家做好功課,多比較幾間車行嘅報價,再去試駕做最終決定。買車係件大事,花少少時間做功課絕對唔會錯。
